

University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1995

Militiamen and frontiers: Changes in the militia from the Peace of Paris to the Great War

Barry M. Stentiford
The University of Montana


Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd>

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Stentiford, Barry M., "Militiamen and frontiers: Changes in the militia from the Peace of Paris to the Great War" (1995). *Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers*. 8838.
<https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8838>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.



Maureen and Mike
MANSFIELD LIBRARY

The University of **MONTANA**

Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety,
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in
published works and reports.

**** Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature ****

Yes, I grant permission



No, I do not grant permission



Author's Signature Bay M. [Signature]

Date 17 May 1995

Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with
the author's explicit consent.

MILITIAMEN AND FRONTIERS:
CHANGES IN THE MILITIA FROM THE
PEACE OF PARIS TO THE GREAT WAR

by

Barry M. Stentiford

B.S., College of Great Falls, 1990

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
University of Montana
1995

Approved by


Chair, Board of Examiners


Dean, Graduate School

July 18, 1995
Date

UMI Number: EP39639

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI EP39639

Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Stentiford, Barry M., M.A., August 1995

History

Evolution of an Idea: Adaption of the Militia from the Peace of Paris to the Great War

Director: Associate Professor Michael S. Mayer *MSM*

At the end of the War of Independence, Americans found themselves with a need for a military force in the Northwest Territory. The government under the Articles of Confederation possessed no authority to create a full-time army. After the new Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, a solution to the problem of national defense emerged. That solution, which included a small regular army which could be augmented by state militia, served with little modification until the early twentieth century, when a crisis on a border exposed the drawbacks of the system. This study examines the process through which the old Revolutionary idea of a strong state-based militia as the main instrument of national defense was slowly replaced by a mostly federally controlled National Guard as a second line of defense.

The first part of this study is based on the writings of those most influential in creating the constitutional basis for the old Regular Army and militia. Later chapters rely on the writings of those involved in the Preparedness debate of the early twentieth century. The experience of the Regular Army and the National Guard in response to Pancho Villa's raids on the Mexican border are explored as the catalyst for change just prior to the Great War. The Militia Acts of 1792, 1903, and 1908, several Volunteer Acts, as well as the National Defense Act of 1916, provide the basic focus.

The military needs of the Northwest Territory in the 1780s and the Mexican border area in 1916 exposed the weaknesses of the militia system. Both times, America responded by strengthening federal control of military force at the expense of the states. Change came only when real, rather than hypothetical, challenges could not be met under the existing structure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	ii
Table of Contents.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
Chapters	
I. The Old Northwest and the Constitution.....	3
II. The Preparedness Debate.....	26
III. The Mexican Border as a Catalyst for Change....	40
IV. Adoption of the National Defense Act of 1916...	69
V. Conclusion.....	89
Selected Bibliography.....	93

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is the result of several periods of intense activity, interspaced with long periods of procrastination. Along the way, several people have either helped me or encouraged me to see this job to its completion. First is Prof. H. D. Hampton, who years ago allowed me join his seminar and begin to put my ideas in order in what became chapter four.

Academically, I owe a great deal of gratitude to Prof. Michael S. Mayer, for his work on my behalf, his guidance to do this right, and his seemingly infinite patience with me over the last few years. Prof. Harry Fritz and Prof. William McBroom were kind enough to come in late and serve on my committee and force me to re-think some ideas.

I need to thank my friends at the University of Alabama for listening to me gripe about my unfinished thesis, and then listen to me bounce ideas and gripe as I was finishing it.

My entire family has always encouraged education, and without their support and example, I doubt I would have started my undergraduate degree.

And Bobo--sorry I didn't protect you from the dog, but I did shoot him later.

Introduction

America has two distinct military institutions--the Regular Army and the militia. Both institutions had a history in England that began long before the establishment of British colonies on the east coast of North America. Shortly after settlement in the New World, the English in Massachusetts Bay Colony established a colonial militia for their protection. Interest in the colonial militia rose and fell with the threat from Indians and French. The institution, however, continued throughout the colonial period. The colonial militia remained a locally-based military force for the protection of the town, or for use by the colonial government. Although the militia aided the British army in the mid-eighteenth century, the militia in both England and America remained distinct from the army. After independence from Britain, America began a slow process that eventually wrought a fundamental change in the relationship between the militia and the army.

The relationship between state militia and the federal government underwent two periods of transformation between the end of the War of Independence and the beginning of the Great War. The first change came with the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 and the passage of the Militia Act of

1792, which established a full-time regular army plus a state-based militia for national defense and local security. The system created in those early years served the Republic through the nineteenth century.

In the early twentieth century, the Militia Act of 1903 began the process of integrating the National Guard more fully into the defense structure. However, traditional fears of a federal monopoly on military force prevented a practical integration of the National Guard with the Regular Army. Events on the Mexican border and in northern Mexico following the Mexican Revolution exposed weaknesses in the American defense structure. With a major European war threatening to involve the United States, military operations on the Mexican border fully taxed the American military establishment. As a consequence, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916, partially to integrate further the National Guard and Regular Army. The Great War in Europe threatened to entangle the United States; however, it took the actual experience in Mexico to bring about concrete changes in the relationship between the Regular Army and the National Guard.

I. The Old Northwest and the Constitution

Between the Peace of Paris at the end of the Revolutionary War, and the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, state militia provided the new nation with its only substantial military force.¹ In part, this desire to disband the Continental Army resulted from the Englishmen's traditional fear of a standing army, combined with the belief that the new nation had no need to keep a standing army. Opposition to the proposed Society of Cincinnati, consisting of former Continental Army officers, reflected public antipathy to any organization of regulars after the end of hostilities.² With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1789, the federal government received specific permission to create a federal standing army not dependent on the states for recruiting or equipping. The eight years between the end of the War of Independence and the drafting of the new Constitution combined with experiences from the war to sway

¹Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 45. Kohn estimates that the states had a total of 400,000 men enrolled in the militia.

²James K. Martin, and Mark E. Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington Heights, Il: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982), pp. 202-203.

the balance in favor of a standing army. By 1787, enough of the framers of the new Constitution believed that if the government and nation were to survive internal revolts and to secure the frontier, then the government needed something more professional and reliable than militia.

The Articles of Confederation, from 1 March 1781 until the Constitution went into effect on 4 March 1789, required that each state "...always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia..." along with the stores needed to supply it.³ The Articles also provided for a war-time national army. This was not to be a standing regular army but one dependent on the states. Article VII provided that the state legislatures would raise the land forces for common defense, with the state legislatures commissioning all officers below the rank of general, and that the home state's legislature kept the sole authority to fill any vacancies that occurred in the officer corps during the period its forces were engaged in the common defense. The fifth paragraph of Article IX explained the method for apportioning the burden of providing individual soldiers among the states.⁴

The government under the Articles of Confederation clearly received the authority to gather an army from state regiments, as well as the responsibility to pay it. However, the national government lacked a reliable method of raising

³Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4.

⁴Ibid., Article IX, Paragraph 5.

money to pay for an army, and the states actually received the responsibility to form and equip the regiments. After the states raised, equipped, and trained their quota of regiments, the federal government would muster the regiments into federal service. These state-raised regiments together formed the national army; no regular units existed. This system resembled more the method used in North America during the French and Indian Wars, where colonial governments organized and equipped militia, which then served under British generals, than a true federal army.⁵ With regiments in federal service organized by their home states, and with all officers below the rank of general commissioned by their state governments, the state governments would continue to have a strong influence in the national army thus created. The difference between the confederal concept of the national army and the system employed by Britain during the colonial period was that the colonial militia had a regular British army to augment, whereas none existed under the Articles.⁶ During the Revolutionary War, the militia augmented the professional Continental Army, but the Articles did not provide for the retention or recreation of the Continental Army after the war.

⁵Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 17.

⁶In the nineteenth century, the United States would return to a system closely resembling that of the colonial period. In the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish Wars, as well as many Indian wars, the locally raised U.S. Volunteers augmented the small Regular Army for the duration of the conflicts.

In the concept outlined in the Articles, a "federal" army existed only when called into service for war, revolt, or other emergency. Most likely, the bulk of men and officers raised by the states for their quotas would come from the militia.

The system envisioned by the framers of the Articles lacked the ability to sustain a prolonged military presence on the frontier. With the British army due to evacuate the old Northwest, the newly independent United States had no national forces with which to fill the vacuum. George Washington and other nationalists feared that the Indians would either dismantle or burn the forts in the Northwest when the British evacuated them under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.⁷

The part time nature of state militia rendered them ill-suited for the mission. Militiamen with families and farms or businesses could not be expected to remain at frontier posts for more than a few months, and the constant rotation would burden both the commanders of the forts by constantly changing their soldiers and the militia system itself. The framers of the Articles of Confederation drafted their plan of government during the war with Great Britain. They planned a military system to defend the nation against a more conventional

⁷John Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of George Washington from the original Manuscript sources, 1745-1799 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), P. 26:398-400. In a letter of 3 May 1783 to the President of the Continental Congress, Washington expressed his urgent desire to occupy the forts as soon as the British evacuated them.

adversary--similar to Great Britain. However, the early years of independence presented a very different problem--a seemingly endless struggle with the Indians on the frontier.

Not all leaders in the days after Yorktown saw a national army as something to be avoided. Many of the leaders of the military effort against Great Britain realized that without a professional force developed in peacetime, the security of the Republic remained in jeopardy.⁸ But these men also realized that "they were caught in an uncomfortable dilemma....[T]he standing army was politically unfeasible...yet some regular establishment was imperative because the militia was unquestionably unsound militarily."⁹ Accordingly, men such as Secretary of War Henry Knox, future Secretary of War Timothy Pickering, and drill master of the Continental Army Frederick von Steuben submitted to Washington, at his request, suggestions for strengthening the military structure of the United States. Von Steuben's proposal, outlined in his pamphlet A Letter on the Subject of an Established Militia, and Military Arrangements, Addressed to the Inhabitants of the United States far exceeded the others in scope. Where the others stressed more uniformity, training, and discipline within the present militia structure, Steuben suggested the

⁸Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, p. 74.

⁹Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 44.

creation of three regionally based "Militia Legions."¹⁰ These new "Legions" bore a more than casual resemblance to one of Washington's own ideas for reforming the militia--abolish it in all but name.¹¹ Washington called his plan the "Continental Militia," which proposed a reserve force recruited, trained, and equipped on the national level.¹² Washington consolidated the reports of his subordinates and sent them to Alexander Hamilton, who had requested Washington's advice on the matter, on 2 May 1783.¹³

Hamilton, New York's delegate to Congress, chaired at that time a congressional committee investigating solutions to the nation's need to protect the western frontier, as well as to guard against Britain in the north, and Spain in the south. The proposals eventually submitted to Congress by Hamilton's committee echoed most of the ideas in Washington's Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, which the general had submitted to Congress as his recommendations for a post-war military. As

¹⁰John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 25.

¹¹Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 6:110. Washington's distrust in part-time soldiers shows throughout his writings. Here he hoped, after commanding militia in December on 1776, that he would only again command militia when absolutely necessary. He stressed that only long and hard training could turn civilians into soldiers who would not break under fire.

¹²Ibid., George Washington's "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," 1 May 1783, 26:374-398.

¹³Ibid.

did Washington, Hamilton urged the formation of a standing army, but with the stipulation that the national military be recruited, paid, and supplied by the confederal government. Hamilton also proposed that Congress commission all officers of the national army. Both ideas far exceeded any power given to the central government under the Articles of Confederation.¹⁴

For the militia, Hamilton followed the advice of von Steuben and Washington but added more detail. Believing the militia concept fundamentally useless, he instead proposed a reserve corps of volunteers to be enlisted for eight years, paid and supplied by the national government, and liable for service wherever the national government ordered. This new institution would be city-based, because only the population density of the cities allowed the required numbers of militiamen to live close enough to the training areas to ensure regular drill. Numbers would be kept to 2 percent of those liable for militia service, and the old militia obligation for all adult white males would be allowed to lapse, in the belief that attempts to train the old, infirm, and uninterested only diverted money and talent that could be better used on an elite few.¹⁵ Neither Hamilton nor von Steuben could see any merit in a militia that included all

¹⁴Harold Syrett, ed., Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), "Report on a Military Peace Establishment" 3:378-379.

¹⁵Ibid.

adult men; instead, they placed their hopes on the young, healthy, and enthusiastic. In a period where many Americans feared the power of the central government, and especially the potential for abuse by a standing army, Hamilton's proposals never had much chance of acceptance.¹⁶ Moreover, their plans for the militia, and even more so, the national army, exceeded any authority Congress received from the Articles of Confederation.

Later, Hamilton returned to the problems of creating a viable military force in a society hostile to a peacetime army. In Numbers 24 through 28 of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton argued that the nation needed a full-time professional army.¹⁷ In Number 24, he explained that the nation needed a military presence on the frontier and that either temporary detachments of militia or a small standing army would have to provide this presence. He then argued against using militia to garrison the west because of the added expense of constant rotations and the inevitable opposition by the militiamen themselves if subjected to repeated long-term service. In the Federalist Paper Number 25, he stressed that soldiering, like any other profession, needed

¹⁶Richard Kohn, ed., Anglo-American Military Tracts 1697-1830 (New York: Arno Press, 1979), p. 173-192. An "ORATION DELIVERED AT BOSTON, MARCH 5, 1783" by Dr. Thomas Welsh revealed the distrust both of the standing army, and of the professional soldier, held by many Bostonians.

¹⁷Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 188-207.

at least a core of full-time practitioners if the nation were to be able to defend itself. Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States could legally prepare for war only after another nation either declared war, or actually invaded the United States. Hamilton saw potential external threats coming from Great Britain, Spain, and from the Indians.¹⁸

However, Hamilton argued from a national perspective. The states in the 1780s still saw themselves as independent nations rather than part of a single country. Hence, the representatives from Rhode Island could ask why their militia, as well as the militia from other Atlantic states, should have to protect the frontier of New York and Virginia.¹⁹ Westerners wondered why the burden for protecting the western borders should fall to the states on the frontier, while coastal states enjoyed protection without the cost.

The problem of the western border of the United States soon became confused by the overlapping of state and confederation jurisdiction. Both New York and Pennsylvania requested, in April 1783, assistance in dealing with the Indians in their western lands. New York would continue to press for the authority to raise a state army for the problem, for the Articles of Confederation required congressional

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 190-191.

¹⁹Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 52.

approval for any state to raise a standing army of its own.²⁰ Less than a year later, in March 1784, Virginia officially ceded its claims to territory in the old Northwest.²¹ With the cession, the national government held territory independent of the states without having the means to protect the surveyors needed before the land could be sold. Congress also needed to remove the squatters who had been moving onto the lands, and to negotiate treaties with the Indians before the national government could begin to exploit its wealth in western lands.²²

Making the situation more critical, on 2 June 1784, Congress discharged all but eighty of the remaining 600 men in the Continental Army.²³ The discharged men had been recruited near the end of the war and had needed additional inducements to join. All had been on a higher pay scale, with the additional pay coming from their home states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. With the New England states blocking all efforts to create a standing army, Congress had no choice but to allow the enlistments to lapse. The few remaining active soldiers kept busy guarding the leftover Revolutionary War supplies stored at West Point, New York and Fort Pitt, at the

²⁰Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4.

²¹Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 55.

²²Ibid.

²³Journals of the Continental Congress, Vol. XXVI, (Washington: General Services Administration, National Archives and Record Service, 1976), 26:524.

source of the Ohio.²⁴

Possessing no real army with which to act, Congress faced the ever-pressing problems of squatters and Indians. The problem of occupying the forts along the Great Lakes temporarily abated in September of 1783, when von Steuben reported back from Canada that the British would not evacuate the forts for another year or two.²⁵ The war against Britain had barely ended and the new American government felt relieved when the British failed to evacuate the western forts. The British action temporarily lifted from Congress the burden of forging a plan to occupy the forts in order to keep the Indians from taking and possibly destroying them. Since it had no forces, however, Congress needed to decide on a plan for some show of force to people in the western lands--both Indian and squatter.

As a result of the inability of Washington and Hamilton to create a standing army, on 3 June 1784 Congress asked (for it had no power to demand) that the states of Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey provide a total of 700 soldiers for twelve-months service on the frontier.²⁶ With

²⁴Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 57-60.

²⁵Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 27:120-121. In a letter of 29 August 1783 to Governor George Clinton, Washington expressed his concern over General von Steuben's report to Washington dated 22 Aug 1783 in which von Steuben indicated that the British were not leaving the forts.

²⁶Many authors see this force as the beginning of the United States Army that has existed up to the present. This theme is echoed in almost every secondary source that mentions

this regiment, Congress had not created a true national army; the power base of this force remained in the states that raised it and not with the national government. Congress could only request that the states send the troops. In fact, Connecticut raised its troops too late for service, and New York did not raise any.²⁷ This First United States Regiment became "permanent" in April 1785 when, with the original enlistments about to expire, the states permitted Congress to enlist regulars for three years of service. Although not completely in compliance with Congress's authority to raise an army under the Articles of Confederation, this arrangement provided the only military force of the national government in the frontier areas until the new Constitution came into operation.

Those who argued against a standing army and for a reliance on the militia did not do so out of a desire to destroy the nation.²⁸ Many had fully internalized the

the topic. See Chambers, To Raise an Army, p. 24, Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 60, or Francis Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier 1783-1846 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 9.

²⁷John K. Mahon, "Pennsylvania and the Beginnings of the Regular Army," Pennsylvania History 21 (January 1954), 33-44.

²⁸Congressman Elbridge Gerry from Marblehead, Massachusetts often led the fight against a standing army. In several speeches to the Confederation Congress, Gerry emotionally warned of the threats to liberty a standing army represented. He was a leading New England congressman and often pulled all the New England Congressmen with him in voting. The "Proclamation of 18 Oct 1783" in the Journals of the Continental Congress provides a good example of both his logic and style of expression.

mythology of the embattled farmers of Lexington and Concord and fully believed in the ability of their militia to defeat regular troops.²⁹ They knew the Continental Army played a major role in securing independence but saw a national army as an emergency measure to be invoked only when the survival of the republic demanded it. As with the debates in America before the Revolution, they saw in a standing army as great a threat to their liberties as an invasion by a foreign power.³⁰ Whatever the drawbacks of the militia, it would always remain a voice of the populace and could not act against the people, for the people embodied the militia. With a standing army, the national government possessed the thin edge of a wedge with which slowly to destroy the liberty of the people. A standing army gave Congress both the reason to collect taxes (to pay for the army) and the means to enforce collection.

The regionalism of the United States also contributed to the reliance on militia. The relatively wealthy New England states saw no reason to send their well-equipped militia to

²⁹Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 333. Royster argues that lack of virtue within the militia forced reliance on the Continental Army.

³⁰Lawrence Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 46-47. Cress argues that radical Whig rhetoric popular in the 1760s continued to play a role in the political discourse of the nation, especially in New York and New England. In Boston, which had recent experience with regulars in the 1770s, opposition to standing armies remained deeply ingrained in the populace.

the west to protect New York and Pennsylvania. The poorer states of the South, where militia duty often focused on control of slaves rather than Indians, looked on a national military force with less fear. Many Southerners saw a standing army as a way to protect their exposed frontier areas without forcing free white men to accept army discipline. New York, with an exposed western frontier, an international border, and a dispute with Massachusetts over western New York, wanted permission to form a state army to deal with its problems. For more than a year, Congress stalled on New York's request. With the formation of the First United States Regiment, the United States in Congress Assembled did not see any need to allow New York to create a standing army of its own.³¹

The militia in this period did exceptionally little aside from providing an article of faith for those opposed to the creation of a standing army. Only two incidents of any size involved militia, and both underscored the problems of relying wholly on the militia for the republic's military purposes. From Kentucky, George Rogers Clark led an unauthorized expedition into the Ohio Valley against Indians using 1,200 state militia. However, many of the militiamen Clark drafted for the expedition resisted--often with violence. The campaign quickly collapsed; desertion and insubordination destroyed any military effectiveness the expedition ever had. The Virginia

³¹Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 58.

government soon called Clark back to explain his actions. This aborted adventure served to underscore the difficulties in using part-time soldiers in an area far from their homes, and for purposes not immediately affecting them.³²

Late in the summer of 1786, another incident involving the militia proved to have a more far reaching impact on the country and its fundamental political system. Shays's Rebellion resulted from the unequal distribution of wealth between eastern and western Massachusetts. A shortage of specie caused by Britain's demand for hard currency from the newly independent United States hit New England especially hard. Western farmers, used to a barter-based economy, became desperate when their eastern commercial creditors began to demand currency, and almost none was available. This desperation soon led to a civil war in western Massachusetts. Daniel Shays built an army from the angry farmers of western Massachusetts. The Shaysites claimed that they wanted only to prevent the courts from seizing land and imprisoning farmers for debt, but the threat of anarchy terrified the state government in Boston. The situation became even more dangerous for leaders in eastern Massachusetts when the local militia of

³²Most of the summary of Clark's expedition was gleaned from Leonard C. Helderman, "The Northwest Expedition of George Rogers Clark, 1786-1787," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 25 (December 1938), 317-334.

western Massachusetts failed to end the insurrection.³³ The affair exposed a serious weakness within both the militia system and the framework for a national army outlined in the Articles.

Without a regular professional army, the national government depended on the states to furnish the soldiers needed to end insurrections. However, the people of the area who were supposed to form the militia to quell the rebellion either joined the Shaysites, or at least remained in sympathy with them. The national government feared for the arsenal in Springfield, where surplus military stores from the revolution had been stored by the Continental Congress. Shays arrived in Springfield with an army of 1,100 men and forced the state supreme court out of the city. When the insurgents decided to take the federal arsenal, the national government could initially do little to prevent it. The handful of national soldiers guarding the arsenal were greatly outnumbered. Only the actions of the few loyal militia drawn from the market towns of western Massachusetts, and the confusion within the approaching Shaysite columns, prevented the capture of the arsenal before the arrival of a force from eastern Massachusetts. Panic swept Connecticut and New Hampshire as

³³David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), p. 80. When Shays's forces surrounded the Worcester county courthouse, the responses from Worcester militiamen to attempts to organize them for protecting the court ranged from evasion of duty to "flat denial."

the rebellion grew. Massachusetts finally ended the rebellion without Congressional assistance after a half year of destruction and fear. To destroy Shays's army, enough militia men and volunteers from the eastern part of the state had to be mobilized and sent to the western part. Congress, and Washington, could do little but watch anxiously.³⁴

In the end, state military forces ended the rebellion. At least in one sense, proponents of the militia system could feel vindicated by the outcome; an insurrection by a minority of citizens of the state had been controlled by the majority. However, leaders in eastern Massachusetts saw the impotence of the national government in keeping order and ending anarchy. The initial failure of the local militia to end the rebellion also alarmed many proponents of the militia. Many militiamen of western Massachusetts flouted militia discipline and either disobeyed orders or joined the rebels. From the frustration of the Confederation Congress in the crisis, and the new willingness of New England leaders to allow a ready force, the Constitutional Convention overcame the earlier qualms over a standing federal army when they met to strengthen the

³⁴Ibid., pp. 102-103., Also, Prucha, Sword, p. 6. The Confederation Congress eventually authorized the calling of additional national troops--including 660 from Massachusetts--ostensibly to fight Indians. However, Knox confidentially wrote that he had assisting the government of Massachusetts in mind when he asked for the additional troops. Eventually, the state forces were able to end the rebellion before the new national forces intervened, and only two companies of the new national forces remained on active duty to guard the Springfield arsenal.

government under the Articles in the spring of 1787.³⁵

With the new federal Constitution of 1787, the framers sought to correct the weaknesses of the militia system apparent under the Articles of Confederation. In the new Constitution, Congress received expressed permission "[t]o raise and support armies" without limiting that power to times of war or immediate threat thereof.³⁶ The only check on Congress's power to raise armies concerned the financing of them. The budget could not be appropriated for more than two years at a time. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the same section concerned the militia in the new federal system. Congress received permission for "calling forth" (federalizing) "the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasion." The Constitution gave the position of Commander-in-Chief of both the army of the United States, and also the militia when in federal service, to the president.³⁷

In line with the suggestions of Hamilton and Washington for strengthening the militia, Congress received explicit

³⁵George Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1776), pp. 149-152. Gerry had a fear of mob violence almost as strong as his fear of monarchical tyranny. When the rebellion began, Gerry saw the national government's potential response as the greater threat to liberty. Later he became reconciled to the idea that central power needed to be increased to prevent anarchy.

³⁶United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph 12.

³⁷Ibid., Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 1.

permission to organize, discipline, and arm the militia of the states, and to govern any part of the militia in federal service. States received the rights to commission militia officers and to enforce the federal standards in training the militia.³⁸ As in the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution forbade the states from keeping standing armies in peacetime without federal permission.³⁹ Lest future generations misread federal authority over the state militia to mean that the federal government had the power either to abolish or forbid the states to keep a militia, the Bill of Rights specifically gave the states the right to keep a militia.⁴⁰

The evolution from a wartime national army constituted from regiments organized by the states, as outlined in the Articles of Confederation, to the standing army authorized in the Constitution, must be seen against the backdrop of the experience of confederation. The Articles came into existence in the middle of a struggle against Parliament's power over the colonies. The document framed during this time reflected the desire to be free and independent states. The militia contributed greatly to winning the War for Independence, but the Continental Army won the key battles that assured

³⁸Ibid., Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 16.

³⁹Articles of Confederation, Article VI, section 4; Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Paragraph 3.

⁴⁰Constitution, Amendment II.

independence.⁴¹ However, Americans did not fight the war to replace one perceived tyranny with another. As such, they retained their traditional Englishmen's suspicion of a standing army in peacetime. This sentiment had particular force in New England. In theory, the idea of an armed populace, the militia, sounded practical. Reality showed otherwise.

The new nation expected to pay off its war debt, and pay for much of the national expenses, with the sale of western lands. But no militia could be drawn from an area belonging to the states in common and having no legal white settlers. Shays's Rebellion demonstrated the drawbacks of the militia for ensuring domestic tranquility. Hardened to the realities of national sovereignty, the framers of the Constitution adopted a dual structure of United States land forces. The federal government created a standing army, and the states retained the right to maintain a militia that could both augment the federal force and serve the state. The Militia Act of 1792 put the constitutional ideal into law.

However, the enthusiasm needed to maintain the militia soon waned. Although the Act of 1792 required all males between 18 and 45 to arm themselves and attend a yearly

⁴¹In his The Military Policy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1907), a book in no way sympathetic to the concept or reality of militia, Emory Upton estimated that the Continental Army fielded a total of 231,771 soldiers during the course of the war, while the militia fielded 164,087. (p. 58).

muster, this law soon fell into disuse.⁴² During wartime, a related concept--the Volunteers--filled the militia role. Volunteers, first authorized in 1806, rested on dubious constitutional ground.⁴³ While the president has broad powers to "raise and support armies," the Volunteers tended to be regiments organized from companies raised at the local level, with officers below the rank of general receiving their commissions from the governors of their respective states.⁴⁴ Although the Constitution reserved the authority to raise regiments and commission officers to the states, the Volunteers were not true militia.⁴⁵ Instead, the Volunteers were usually state forces raised for a specific period of federal service.

The militia, as proposed by the Founding Fathers, never existed in the United States. The experience in the Revolutionary War came closest, but after independence, the federal and state governments neglected to enforce the militia laws. Instead, what was commonly called "militia" was in reality organizations of volunteers organized on the local level. These men formed and joined companies either out of

⁴²USSL. Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. XXXIII. sec. 1.

⁴³USSL. "An Act authorizing a detachment from the Militia of the United States." Ninth Congress. Sess. I. Chap XXXII, sec 2, 5.

⁴⁴Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 12.

⁴⁵Ibid., Paragraph 16.

patriotism, enjoyment, or local contacts, but not out of legal obligation.⁴⁶ Therein began a legal fiction: the states legitimized and supported these organizations, and in return these organizations performed traditional militia functions for the state. With these voluntary companies to assist the state government in strike-breaking, riot-control, and disaster relief, the states were relieved of the burden of enforcing a true militia law. In the years after the Civil War, states increasingly relied on these companies to disrupt organized labor during strikes. Their federal mission would not develop until after the beginning of the twentieth century.

The transformation of these so-called militia units into the modern National Guard lasted the better part of a century. The first use of the term "National Guard" came in 1824 when certain units from New York adopted the title on the occasion of Lafayette's return to the United States.⁴⁷ By the end of the century, only three states had not adopted the term for their part-time state military forces.⁴⁸ Whatever the name, these state-based companies did not enter federal service during the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish wars. Instead, they regrouped, often with mostly the same members, as units of

⁴⁶Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard," Military Affairs 5 (Summer 1941): 73-86, 152-170.

⁴⁷Col. Emmons Clark, History of the Seventh Regiment of New York, 1806-1889, (New York: 1890), 1:105.

⁴⁸"The Organized Militia of the United States," War Department Document #32 (1897) p. 283.

state Volunteers that were mustered into federal service, or as US Volunteers. This vaguely defined system for national defense that would last until the Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916 again changed the paradigm.

II. The Preparedness Debate

Leaders in America had been concerned with the proper balance of military force and preparedness since the Revolutionary War. The Militia Act of 1792 had been an attempt by the First Congress to provide a credible second line of defense without bankrupting the country or resorting to a militarization of American society. These two themes--credibility without militarization--became the focus of the preparedness debate of the early twentieth century. In retrospect, the Spanish-American War represented the swan-song of the old system, and the Great War marked the dawn of the modern American military establishment. However, in the decades before the sinking of the USS Maine, the debate had already crystallized into two main groups. Both groups agreed that militia remained negligible as long as states retained control over any aspects of them. The two groups differed over the proper mix of regulars and reservists and the time needed to turn an American civilian into a competent soldier.

In the century following the adoption of the Constitution, Congress made no substantial changes to the Militia Act of 1792. However, in the years following the War

of 1812, the militia as an institution fell into disuse.¹ Few Americans, including Congressmen, saw any need for citizens to waste time drilling when no danger threatened and more profitable pursuits beckoned.² Instead, the army expanded during the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American Wars through the institution of the United States Volunteers. The Volunteers, not mentioned in the Constitution, resembled more the military system envisioned by the framers of the Articles of Confederation. Volunteer regiments usually consisted of ten companies of roughly eighty men locally recruited. The men from each company elected their officers; the governor of the state would appoint the regimental officers; and the regiment would then be mustered into federal service for a prior agreed-on period.³ The Regular Army, dwarfed during the Civil War by the Volunteers, remained intact, although individual officers could get leaves of absence to accept commissions with the state-based Volunteers. In the years after the Civil War, increased professionalism within the Regular Army led to

¹Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 15.; Weigley, History of United States Army, pp. 156-157.

²In slave holding areas, a greater percentage of the white male population participated in the organized militia. However, this formed more a posse against the threat of slave insurrection than a true military force.

³Volunteer Act of 1806. Twelfth Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 32. sec. 2-5. This was the first act authorizing the president to call for Volunteers corps from the states.

a debate over the future composition of the wartime army.⁴ In the preparedness debate that began in America after the summer of 1914, the somewhat abstract speculations of the 1880s became urgent arguments as the nation sought the proper balance of trained professional soldiers and patriotic citizen-soldiers in a world that suddenly seemed far more dangerous.

The first group to challenge the status quo followed the teachings of Emory Upton, a Civil War hero and protege of General William T. Sherman. Although Upton's The Military Policy of the United States would not be published until 1904, copies of it passed through the War Department during the decades before the turn of the century.⁵ Upton's work combined his interpretation of American military history with his infatuation with the German military. Arguing that state control of, and influence on, militia would always make it unreliable to the federal army as an effective reserve, Upton sought a long-term reserve force wholly under federal control. Regardless of the geographical, cultural, and political differences between Germany and the United States, the concept

⁴Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 269-272.

⁵Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, GPO, 1904); also, Stephen Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964). The final chapter, "Influence," traces some of the effects of Upton's unpublished work on the army from his death in March 1881 until the Great War.

of locally recruited and locally supported units became anathema to the disciples of Emory Upton. Instead, the Uptonites sought total federal control over recruiting, organizing, and leading of any non-Regular forces to be employed in war.

Although written for the educated layman, Upton's book remained out of reach for many Americans. Harris Dickson, a convinced Uptonite, attempted to popularize the lessons of Military Policy in a much shorter work, The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself.⁶ To make his point, Dickson assumed the role of a chastising Uncle Sam who warned Americans of the folly of the militia myth. From the Revolutionary War through the nineteenth century, Uncle Sam showed the unreliability of militia in war. At the end, Uncle Sam praised the recently established mechanism for a "selective draft" as the only truly democratic way to defend the nation. He urged that the nation should train its youth in basic military skills so that they could reap the benefits of patriotism and exercise in peacetime, become competent soldiers in less time upon reaching adulthood, and perhaps avoid being slaughtered in wartime.

An even closer emulation of Upton's book can be found in The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: A History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915 by

⁶Harris Dickson, The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself as Recorded in Uncle Sam's Own Words (New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1917).

Frederic Huidekoper.⁷ This book attempted to improve and update Upton's work. The author claimed to have filled the holes in Upton's Military Policy, which he may have done, but at the expense of clarity. Like Upton, the main purpose of the book, as obvious from the title, was to show that the nation constantly fell short in military preparedness and later paid in blood. Also in line with Upton, the book showed the constant weakness of the militia system that resulted from state control. The book concluded with Huidekoper's suggestions for improving American military preparedness. Like many in the debate, he called for an enlarged Regular Army, which would serve as a school for a body of federal reserves. After two years active service, a soldier would enter the reserves for five years. Under Huidekoper's system, the militia, as a state-controlled force, would end.

However, the concept of the citizen-soldier remained embedded in the American psyche. Certain high ranking soldiers, led by General Leonard Wood, reached the opposite conclusions from Upton. To Wood, the average American male could be transformed into a competent soldier with only a few months of intensive training. The better element (ie: the educated classes) of society could be made into officers in a slightly longer period. Wood, however, remained something of

⁷Frederic Huidekoper, Military Preparedness of the United States: A History of American Land Forces from Colonial times until June 1, 1915 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). The introduction of the book was written by Major General Leonard Wood.

a maverick in the army. Not a West Pointer, Wood received his original commission as a doctor in the army medical corps. During the Spanish-American War, Theodore Roosevelt and his Rough Riders impressed Wood both with their unfamiliarity with military procedures, and with their ability to follow orders and accomplish missions. A decade later, in the preparedness debate, Wood placed great faith in the citizen-soldier. To train educated civilians in the rudiments of military life, he began to hold a series of summer training camps, the first of which he established at Plattsburg, New York. At these camps, Wood began to put his faith into practice, often with noted success. The educated men adapted well to military life, and learned the rudiments of soldiering faster than most regulars believed they would.⁸

Throughout this period, Wood spoke frequently on the need for Universal Military Service. Three of his speeches appeared in book form in The Military Obligation of Citizenship.⁹ As the title implied, Wood's belief that citizenship carried an obligation of military service provided a recurring theme of the three speeches. In "The Policy of the United States in Raising and Maintaining Armies," delivered at Princeton on 15

⁸John Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972); also Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 193-196.

⁹Leonard Wood, The Military Obligation of Citizenship (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915).

April 1915, Wood argued that "[t]he experience of the Revolution should have taught us that it is not safe in real war to depend on Volunteers."¹⁰ Instead, he maintained, the United States needed to require military service from all, as the army saw fit. Perhaps facing reality, Wood's position transformed between the first speech in the book and the third. On 15 June 1915, Wood gave a speech entitled "The Civil Obligation of the Army" at St. Paul's School. Only two months after calling for the elimination of the Volunteer system, Wood instead outlined his plan to improve the Volunteers. If the Volunteers were to be of any use in the next war, "we must have a great body of 35,000 or 40,000 reserve officers trained and ready to serve as officers of Volunteers."¹¹ Wood accepted, at least partially, that the Volunteers would most likely continue to have a role in the American military. However, his summer camps for training reserve officers would ensure that in future wars, the Volunteers would be led by officers with some military training. In the same speech, he remarked on his admiration for the Swiss and Australian systems of military instruction at school, combined with a period in the reserves for all the able-bodied. He never abandoned his desire for universal service. During the same period, Maxwell Van Zandt Woodhull, a former Brevet Brigadier-General of Volunteers from the Civil War, published West Point

¹⁰Ibid., p. 10.

¹¹Ibid., p. 63.

in our Next War: The Only Way to Create and Maintain an Army.¹² In this book, he explained that with a year or two of service, Volunteers were as competent soldiers as Regulars. However, with the advances in shipping and the complexity of war, the nation could no longer rely on Volunteers. The army needed to be able to fight on the first day of a war. With obligations in Alaska, the Canal Zone, the Philippines, and other areas outside the United States, the army remained wholly insufficient for its role, whether in war or peace. To remedy this, Woodhull proposed an immediate expansion of the Regular Army. Then, drawing on his Civil War experiences, he proposed the establishment of a federal corps of trained reserve officers to lead an expanded wartime army. To this end, he hoped to modify West Point so that some students could attend a two year program, after which they would re-enter civilian life. During a war, they would serve as officers for the expanded army.

The problem of a tiny Regular Army with far-flung military obligations also inspired a curious book by Hudson Maxim entitled Defenseless America.¹³ Written with the blessings of General Wood, whose letter to Maxim appears in the book, Maxim's work aimed at awakening the public and

¹²Maxwell Woodhull, West Point in our Next War: The Only Way to Create and Maintain an Army (New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1915).

¹³ Hudson Maxim, Defenseless America (New York: Hearst's International Library Co., 1915).

government to the dangers of modern war. Maxim took great pains to show the vulnerability of the nation and urged a large military build-up. Without naming the potential foe, Maxim warned of the calamity of a future invasion of American territory. Using the example of the Great War, he showed that America needed to begin producing more guns, planes, and soldiers immediately if disaster were not to befall the nation.

Another book, written before the Great War began but not published until 1915, also envisioned the Regular Army as a training school for an expanded war-time army. This book, The American Army, by William Harding Carter, traced what he saw as a fundamental shift in the role of the Regular Army.¹⁴ To Carter, the Regulars no longer trained to fight as an army, but to prepare reservists for an expanded army. In other words, the Regular Army existed as a corps of instructors for an expanded war-time army. Retired Commanding General Nelson Miles also subscribed to this idea of the regulars as a skeleton from which to expand the army in wartime. In testimony to Congress in February of 1916, Miles pressed for a forces of between 140,000 and 150,000, which would expand in war to a half million men. Miles bitterly opposed a conscripted federal reserve army, which he saw as an attempt

¹⁴William Carter, The American Army (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1915), pp. 31-49.

to Germanize America.¹⁵

The opposite approach came from "The Debater's Handbook Series" volume, National Defense, which specifically called for universal training, followed by at least one year on active duty and a longer period in the reserves for all males.¹⁶ This book presented a sampling of arguments on the preparedness issue, but all concluded with a call for increases in overall national readiness. The bibliography at the beginning listed pacifist groups and publications as well as preparedness groups, but the essays all supported an expanded military.

Not all books from the debate carried a strong agenda. Less biased and more informative was Military and Naval America by Captain Harrison Kerrick of the army.¹⁷ While he did use the first chapter to show with various statistics the deficiency of the United States in all areas from artillery to ships, a break-down of every aspect of the American military fills most of the book. Kerrick explained not only the various branches of the army and navy, but also the militia, military colleges, Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and Boy Scouts. Rather than a

¹⁵Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), pp. 260-261.

¹⁶Agnes Van Valkenburgh, ed., Selected Articles on National Defense including Compulsory Military Service, Vol. 2 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1917).

¹⁷Harrison Kerrick, Military and Naval America (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1915).

political tract, Kerrick's book filled the role of primer of the total military resources of the United States.

One American probably spoke louder on the issue of preparedness than any other, Theodore Roosevelt. In his book, Fear God and Take Your Own Part, he mused on a number of aspects that bothered him.¹⁸ Although he could not decide which problem loomed larger--Mexico or Germany--he definitely found fault with the president's handling of both problems. In the chapter "A Sword For Defence", Roosevelt called for universal service in both peace and war. He railed against what he called the "failed" system of Great Britain--volunteers--and instead urged a system of obligatory service, as in Germany, Switzerland, and Australia. He also pushed for an expansion of the Plattsburg Camps, which his son attended, as well as for military instruction in the public schools. Perhaps most surprising, given his fame with the Rough Riders and his later attempts to recruit a regiment for the Great War, was his critique of the Volunteers. He explained that the inequities of the Volunteer system prevented it from meeting the nation's military needs. Under the Volunteer system, patriotic and virtuous men carried the burden for the lazy and timid. The preparedness issue, however, filled only one section of the book, for Roosevelt's mind soon dashed off to tackle the problems of hyphenated Americanism, the treachery

¹⁸Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1916).

of pacifism, Armenia, and again, Mexico.

For reasons unconnected with anti-militarism, a powerful lobbying group in Washington opposed the creation of a federally controlled reserve. The National Guard Association lobbied for recognition as the second line of defense, behind the Regular Army. Unfortunately for the National Guard, Attorney General George W. Wickersham issued an opinion in February 1912 that as militia, National Guard could not be used beyond the borders of the United States.¹⁹ Carter, as well as the National Guard itself, bemoaned this Constitutional barrier. Fearing that they might be shunted aside in favor of a new federal reserve, the National Guard Association lobbied hard for a solution to the Constitutional barrier, and to secure recognition as the second line of defense.²⁰

One of the works from the period that opposed the preparation movement was Preparedness: The American versus The Military Programme by William Hull.²¹ After a careful examination of the threat to the United States by a first rate

¹⁹George Kearney, ed., Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in relation to Their Official Duties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), 29:322-329. Attorney General George W. Wickersham expressed his opinions in a letter to the Secretary of War on 17 February 1912.

²⁰Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 28-32.

²¹William Hull, The American versus The Military Programme (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1916), pp. 268-271. Hull was a professor of History and International Relations at Swarthmore College.

power, Hull reasoned that America could not remain free and still meet the threat by military means. He explained that the numbers of men needed and training required would result in a Prussianization of American society. Partial preparation only wasted time, money, and later, lives. Instead, Hull argued that America could best help to end the war in Europe, and war in general, by setting an example for the world. The only purpose for the United States military should be for the policing of the areas under United States' sovereignty but not part of a state, and for the patrolling of the three-mile limit on the ocean for pirates. Hull fell short when he attempted to explain how a foreign invader would be stopped. He envisioned a world that followed America's example and one that would have international agreements on peace. Beyond that hope, he offered no ideas for reaction if an invasion actually occurred.

By 1915, President Woodrow Wilson had shifted from a traditional Progressive position of opposition to militarism to one in favor of preparedness.²² Although he reassured the National Guard that he had no plans to dissolve it, he had become an Uptonite.²³ In response to the war in Europe, Wilson backed a plan by Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison that called for an expansion of the Regular Army, increases in the

²²Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises 1915-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 21.

²³Ibid., p. 21.

navy, and a large reserve force completely under federal control.²⁴ To placate the National Guard, the Guard would receive a slight increase in federal support, but would be relegated to police duties. However, traditional suspicion of military expansion remained strong, especially in the president's own party, the Democrats. The Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, broke with the administration to fight against the president's plan. Bryan felt, as did many opponents to preparedness, that Americans would fight if the nation were invaded. However, as no nation seemed about to invade, preparedness would be the first step on road towards European-style militarism.²⁵ With massive opposition from within his own party, and the resignation of Secretary of War Garrison, Wilson's attempts at improving the defenses of the nation appeared dead by February 1916.

The preparedness debate continued unresolved until President Wilson asked for and received a declaration of war on the central powers. However, some consensus was reached. The country as a whole seemed unwilling to support universal military training, but it did support voluntary training. In the years before the Great War, Americans found conscription as repugnant as it had been to their grandfathers. Americans opposed forcing men into uniform before an actual state of war existed. By the time the U.S. declared war, little of the

²⁴Ibid., p. 18.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 30-33.

eventual compromise for preparedness had been implemented. The partisans of preparedness had not devised a plan for a nation at war, but a nation at peace. Thus, Wilson turned to a very different model for the organization of the army in the Great War. However, some of the goals of the preparedness advocates became part of the National Defense Act of 1916. Only the short time span between its passage and America's entry into war nullified most of the significance of the preparedness measures.

The National Defense Act of 1916 compromised between the various schools of thought on preparedness. Wood's training camps received official recognition. The National Guard took a dual oath and became the official second line of defense. The Volunteer system remained in theory, with an expansion of R.O.T.C. and Plattsburg-type camps to train its future officers.²⁶ The realities of mobilization against the Central Powers altered the plan somewhat, but the debate over preparedness had brought to the foreground most of the proposed changes that the National Defense Act would later embody. However, a vague and distant threat of war from Europe could not incite Americans to alter the basic structure of their army. Instead, a very near and real problem on the Mexican border provided the catalyst for implementing the changes proposed during the debate over preparedness.

²⁶National Defense Act of 1916, Sixty-fourth Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 134. sec 37.

III. The Mexican Border as a Catalyst for Change

The debate over preparedness reflected a growing realization that the military system needed adjustment. However, real change would come only after the old system proved unable to meet the defense needs of the nation. Far more than the potential for American involvement in the war in Europe, real problems on the Mexican border demonstrated to Americans that the old relationship between militia and Regular Army was no longer adequate to the mission of protecting the United States and allowing the president to project American military power.

The military system created in the early days of the republic served fundamentally unchanged throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, plus a few Indian Wars, with little change to the system. As was the case in the 1780s, problems on the border of the United States exposed the weaknesses in the system. The use of Volunteers in the Mexican and Spanish Wars averted the Constitutional problem of using militia outside the territory of the United States, but after the Spanish-American War the National Guard replaced the Volunteers as the method for

expanding the army in wartime. In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Mexican border, rather than the old Northwest, presented a problem for the land forces of the United States that the existing structure was ill-equipped to handle.

Before the outbreak of revolution in 1910, Mexico was regarded as a model of pre-industrialized stability. Before stability returned to Mexico, America would get a rude awakening on the inadequacy of the Regular Army and the National Guard. Almost alone among western powers, the United States had no federal military reserves--no established system for expanding the small standing army into a large force if needed quickly.

Problems with Mexico, combined with the territorial expanse of the American empire, soon exposed the inadequacy of the old system. With most of the Regular Army troops based in the United States on an expeditionary force into Mexico, the president called the entire National Guard to the Mexican border to prevent more crossings by Mexican guerrillas. While the American army was occupied on the border and in Mexico, events in Europe drew the United States closer to world war. America faced this situation with no reserves left.

Before the United States entered the European war, Mexico provided a small-scale test for the American defense system. Although the actual combat in Mexico more closely resembled the later Indian campaigns than the European war, the campaign

in Mexico allowed the army to glimpse the future. The American expedition took airplanes, motor vehicles, and radios into Mexico. Both Regular Army and National Guard officers received experience in leading large numbers of men. Without the experience with Mexico, the American Expeditionary Force General Pershing took to France would have been far less prepared or competent.

In 1910, the Mexican president, Porfirio Diaz, dictator for thirty years, announced that he would step down and that elections would be held. Francisco Madero, a believer in legal process, announced he would run for the office. Diaz promptly had him arrested and announced his decision to run again despite his earlier promise to step down. Without the ability to change the government by peaceful means, Madero took up the cause of Revolution.¹

However, with the federal army behind him, Diaz soon crushed the rebellion. Madero was not the only revolutionary. Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Pascual Orozco in the north, and Emiliano Zapata in the south, took up the struggle against Diaz. The balance of power in Mexico shifted from beneath Diaz, as he lost control of the countryside and his poorly led army proved unequal to the task of keeping him in power. With mounting forces against Diaz, his thirty-year rule collapsed,

¹Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 55-71.

and he fled the country. Madero then became president.²

Madero, a moderate, proved unable or unwilling to push through the drastic reform measures demanded by the revolutionaries. Eventually, the army rebelled, and President Madero called in the alcoholic General Victoriano Huerta to put down the uprising. After a ten-day battle in Mexico City, Huerta switched sides and had Madero shot. Huerta then claimed the presidency of Mexico. The United States never recognized the Huerta government.³

The assassination of Madero threw Villa into fits of rage. A new rebellion against against this blatantly illegal seizure of power eventually put the Constitutionalist Venustiano Carranza in the presidency. Never happy with peace, Villa continued to rebel against the central government in Mexico City from his native state of Chihuahua on the Texas border.

From the start, the U.S.-Mexican border played an important role in the revolution.⁴ On the American side of the border, revolutionaries plotted in safety. Revolutionaries

²Ibid., pp. 171-244.

³Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 158-162.

⁴Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p. 159; Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 331.

could buy arms and ammunition from American dealers.⁵ Across the border, Villa could sell his rustled cattle to raise money for his army. But the border could also be a disadvantage. Exiled members of the old Mexican ruling class could interfere with the internal affairs of Mexico from the comfort of San Antonio or El Paso. The United States government could at least hinder the arms trade with factions out of favor. Every bullet hole north of the border brought the threat of American intervention to restore order by force.⁶

The threat was not an empty one. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility to act on behalf of the European powers in the New World. With the United States hostile to the idea of direct European involvement, the European powers pressed the United States to protect international investments in Mexico. In April 1914, the American navy seized the Mexican port city of Veracruz, the invasion route during the Mexican-American War, over a perceived slight against the U.S.S. Dolphin, when the local garrison refused to present a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag. Nerves had already been strained over the arrest of a group of American sailors as they came ashore and over the presence of a German cargo ship suspected of carrying

⁵Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, Revolution and the Border (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 16-19, 25.

⁶John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention!: The United States and the Mexican Revolution 1913-1917 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993), p. 191.

arms. Later, the United States Army took over occupation of the city from the navy and Marine Corps. Eventually the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile mediated a settlement, and the army left in late November.⁷

In 1915, after breaking with Carranza, Villa suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Constitutionalist General Alvaro Obregon. During April, Villa lost two battles at Celaya, followed in May by a defeat at Leon. The final battle in this series came that July in Aguascalientes. Each time, Obregon used the modern tools of warfare--the trench, barbed wire, and machine guns--to destroy Villa's army in the same manner that Europeans were destroying each other in the Great War. Obregon goaded Villa's vanity and Villa reacted accordingly--launching massed assaults until his army lay in heaps in the area northwest of Mexico City.⁸

Villa gathered the remnants of his army and returned to northern Sonora. In early November, the battle at Agua Prieta, across the border from Douglas, Arizona, finally destroyed what was left of Villa's army and prestige.⁹ To compound matters, during the battle, Villa learned that President Wilson had granted official recognition to the government of Carranza. Villa also learned that the United States had

⁷Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 196-202.

⁸John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 311.

⁹Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 327-328.

allowed the Constitutionalists to reinforce the border town of Agua Prieta by use of trains passing through United States' territory.¹⁰ For Villa, the Americans now provided both a target for his anger and a chance to win back his honor in the eyes of the people of northern Mexico.¹¹

In mid-January of 1916, an event in the town of Santa Ysabel completely changed Villa's reputation in the United States.¹² Previously Villa enjoyed the image of a Mexican Robin Hood. After Santa Ysabel, Americans saw him as a blood thirsty killer of United States citizens.

From November 1915, the Carranza government had been assuring American mining companies that the violence of the Revolution was over and that operations at the mines could continue. In January of 1916, the Cusi Mining company sent a group of American and Mexican employees from El Paso into Chihuahua to reopen the mines. At the cattle station of Santa Ysabel, west of Chihuahua city, a blockade on the tracks stopped the train. A party of Mexicans, under Colonel Pablo Lopez of Villa's army, boarded the train. The armed men forced the Americans off the train, had them remove their clothes, and shot all of them.¹³ One American feigned death and escaped

¹⁰Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969), pp. 186-187.

¹¹Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 196.

¹²Hart, Revolutionary Mexico, p. 321.

¹³Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 344-355.

to tell the story. Although the incident brought no direct action from President Wilson, the American people now thought of Villa as an enemy of the United States and a murderer of Americans. The American Army would not begin chasing Villa because of the murders at Santa Ysabel, but very shortly the army would receive its marching orders into Mexico because of an even greater outrage.¹⁴

In the early months of 1916, rumors of an impending attack from across the Mexican border became common among the United States soldiers on the American side.¹⁵ By the first week of March, reports that Villa had moved north reached Colonel Herbert J. Slocum, commander of the 13th Cavalry Regiment stationed at Camp Furlong in Columbus, New Mexico.¹⁶ Since rumors also placed Villa all over northern Chihuahua, Slocum did not give much credence to the reports. Moreover, President Wilson had given orders preventing American forces from crossing the border to gather information, which left Slocum with little reliable intelligence on his potential adversary.¹⁷ On the 5th or the 6th of March, the War

¹⁴Link, Confusions and Crisis, pp. 201-203.

¹⁵Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 236-238.

¹⁶Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), pp. 603-604.

¹⁷Col. Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa: The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1934), p. 42. As a major

Department sent Slocum a report of "reliable" information that Villa would cross the border to surrender to the Americans, and "unreliable" information that Villa would raid towns on the American side of the border.¹⁸

Three miles south of Columbus, New Mexico, on the Mexican border, two detachments of United States cavalry from Columbus stood watch.¹⁹ Villa broke his army of about five hundred mounted men into small groups and moved through a gap between the two detachments and into United States' territory. After consolidating on the American side of the border, Villa's army headed towards Columbus. A half mile before the town, Villa again divided his forces. At about four-thirty in the morning, before the sun began to lighten the sky, the Villistas began their attack. One column attacked from the west into the middle of the town, while the other attacked from a southerly route into Camp Furlong, located in the southeast corner of the town.²⁰

Militarily, the raid ended in failure for Villa. Although few Americans except for the camp cooks were awake when the

stationed at Columbus during Villa's raid, Tompkins led the pursuit across the international border immediately following the raid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 46; Link, Confusions and Crisis, p. 205.

¹⁹Herbert Molloy Mason Jr., The Great Pursuit: General John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition across the Rio Grands to Destroy the Mexican Bandit Pancho Villa (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 9.

²⁰Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 48-49.

raid began, the Americans quickly organized a stiff resistance. Most of the American officers lived in the town, many with their families, and were cut off from their men. The Americans nevertheless rallied against the attackers. The Mexicans broke into small groups in face of the American machine guns. In ninety minutes, four Benet-Mercier machine guns fired about 20,000 rounds, despite the tendency of the weapons to jam.²¹

Although this seems like an enormous waste of ammunition, the machine guns greatly aided the Americans by laying a suppressive fire that forced the Mexicans to seek cover and robbed them of freedom of movement. The machine guns, although complicated to load even in daylight and prone to jamming, gave the Americans a large advantage over the attacking Mexicans.²²

Another reason the raid broke down was that the Mexicans expected to find only a small garrison. Finding instead many American soldiers, the Mexicans broke into small, isolated, and confused groups in the darkness. Often their fire served only to signal their position to the Americans.²³ By 6:30, when the Mexican bugler sounded retreat, some sixty-seven Mexicans lay dead in Columbus. Another five had been captured

²¹Ibid., pp. 52-53. The account of the machine guns comes from the report of a Lieutenant Lucas who took charge of the machine guns during the battle.

²²Eisenhower, Intervention!, pp. 222-223.

²³Ibid.

and were executed by hanging.²⁴ As the Mexicans headed back towards the border, the Americans began a counter attack. Under the leadership of Major Frank Tompkins, fifty-nine Americans hounded the raiders until lack of water and shortages of ammunition forced them to abandon the chase fifteen miles south of the border.²⁵ During the retreat from Columbus, the Mexicans lost another hundred killed, as well as two of their own machine guns and most of the plunder taken from the town.²⁶

When Major Tompkins reached the border fence, his troops cut through, and the American force continued in hot pursuit onto Mexican territory. After an initial skirmish with Villa's rear guard, Major Tompkins sent word back to Colonel Slocum on the situation and asked for instructions. Forty-five minutes later the reply came for the major to use his own judgement.²⁷ Tompkins continued the pursuit into Mexico. Eventually, on an open plain, the Mexicans realized how few Americans followed them and turned to fight. The Americans pulled back to a defensible position on a mound and waited for the Mexicans to attack. After forty-five minutes of waiting, the Americans headed back towards Columbus, passing on their way between seventy-five and one hundred dead Mexicans killed on the

²⁴Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 53.

²⁵Ibid., p. 56.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

Mexican side of the border.²⁸

Psychologically, another, stronger border had also been crossed. Although Wilson was quite content to send special agents into Mexico and land the Marines at Veracruz, he had forbidden the United States Army from crossing the border into Mexico. To him, despite his almost constant meddling in the Mexican Revolution since taking office, the United States held a neutral stance in the struggle.²⁹ As long as those Latins elected good men, Wilson would respect their rights as a sovereign nation. Unfortunately, from Wilson's perspective, those Latins refused to cooperate, which forced him to become ever more deeply involved in Mexico.³⁰

The Mexicans, for their part, held a strong antipathy towards the United States. Less than seventy years had passed since the United States annexed half of Mexico following the Mexican-American War, and the resentment remained.³¹ Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility to protect European interests in Mexico. For the Mexicans, this simply meant that the Yankees ignored Mexican sovereignty whenever the Mexicans threatened to stop the export of

²⁸Ibid., p. 57.

²⁹Katz, The Secret War, p. 195.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 156-157.

³¹The Gadsden Purchase of 1853 further increased the Mexican fear of another land grab by the United States. Many Mexicans felt, with good reason, that the United States would use the current unrest in Mexico to annex more territory. Some in Congress were interested in acquiring Baja California.

Mexico's wealth. In 1910 Americans held more invested wealth in Mexico than the Mexicans.³² The occupation of Veracruz stirred up all the old anti-American feelings within the Mexicans. By railing against the Americans and threatening the border, Villa, or any other revolutionary, could become a popular hero to the masses of Mexicans.³³ And after his defeat at Agua Prieta, Villa definitely needed a boost to his popularity.

Fears on the American side that fighting in Mexico might spill into the United States had brought the US Army to the border in 1911. However, the revolutionary armies of Mexico stopped short of actually crossing the border, although at times the United States government did allow favored factions to use American railroads. Most of the duties for the United States Army on the border involved attempting to stop the flow of arms that poured south. Occasionally a few towns in Texas lured bandits who would rob and flee, but never on the scale of the Columbus raid.³⁴ The Columbus raid was a calculated attack on an American town. Villa himself maintained a personal relationship with US Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott, who could never bring himself to believe that Villa took part

³²Katz, The Secret War, pp. 20-26.

³³Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 205.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 195-196.

in the raid.³⁵

After the raid, the United States government entered into a diplomatic dance with the Mexican government of President Venustiano Carranza.³⁶ Although the Mexican and United States governments had agreements permitting mutual hot pursuit of outlaws across the border dating back to Indian problems thirty years before, the Constitutionalist government of Carranza could not stand the domestic political fallout if he allowed American forces to enter unopposed.³⁷ President Carranza sent the American State Department a note through Special Agent John R. Silliman on 10 March 1916, in which he gave his interpretation of the events in Columbus. According to him, Villa had been driven to the reckless attack on Columbus by the "persistent pursuit" of the Constitutionalist General Gutierrez. After a summary of the cross-border Indian raids a generation earlier, Carranza requested that if Villa repeated the raid, the armies of both countries be allowed to cross the border in hot pursuit.³⁸ The United States government, however, was more interested in destroying Villa before he had a chance to raid another border town.

Also on 10 March, President Wilson held a cabinet meeting

³⁵Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The Century Company, 1928), pp. 516-517.

³⁶Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, pp. 207-208.

³⁷Ibid., p. 210.

³⁸Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 66-67

at which he decided, with the full backing of the cabinet, to send a "sufficient body of mobile troops...to locate and disperse or capture the band or bands that attacked Columbus."³⁹ Outside the meeting room, the reporters wanted a statement. President Wilson, speaking before thoroughly planning the United States' goals, said that "An adequate force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays."⁴⁰

After the cabinet meeting, Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker, who held a special grudge against Villa because the raid took place on the day he was sworn in to his new office, made his way to the office of General Hugh Scott. Although Baker was an open pacifist, he held the general in great respect and listened carefully to his advice. When Baker told Scott that he wanted the army to catch Villa, the general pointed out the great problems of sending the army to catch one man. Villa himself could always take a train to the south of Mexico or even to South America. The true target for the United States Army was Villa's army. The new mission statement did not mention the capture of Villa, but instead focused on the army that attacked Columbus as the target for the United

³⁹Newton D. Baker, "Enclosure I, Statement for Press," in Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 36:284.

⁴⁰"A Press Release," 10 March 1916, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 36:287.

States Army.⁴¹ Although the American soldiers at Columbus had shown themselves equal to the task of fighting the Mexican raiders, mounting an expedition into Mexico, while simultaneously guarding the entire border, would soon expose the shortcomings of the army.

On the same day Baker and Scott set the goals of the expedition, the Secretary of War sent a telegram to General Frederick Funston, the Commanding General of the Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In it, Baker outlined the goals he and Scott had agreed on earlier in the day. The message also named Brigadier General John Pershing as the head of the expeditionary force.⁴²

General Pershing was born on 13 September 1860, in a small town in Missouri. Entering West Point at age 22, he graduated 13th out of seventy-seven in his class, although most of the students looked to him as their leader. After graduation he became a cavalry officer and took part in the final Indian campaigns of the southwest.⁴³ Later, while running the R.O.T.C. program at the University of Nebraska, he acquired a reputation for severe, but fair, discipline.⁴⁴ He also led the 10th Cavalry of African-American soldiers in

⁴¹Pershing Papers, Box 372.

⁴²Newton D. Baker, "Memorandum for Adjutant General," 10 March 1916. Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 36:285.

⁴³Vandiver, Black Jack, pp. 47-104.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 105-132.

Montana for two years and took part in the Spanish-American War campaign in Cuba. After the war, he participated in the campaigns against the Moros in the southern Philippines. There his coolness under fire, sound thought, and honor, eventually earned him the respect of the Moros.⁴⁵ Pershing knew how to act in a delicate political atmosphere, as well as how to provide leadership to American forces on a difficult mission.

Pershing married the daughter of Senator Francis E. Warren of Wyoming, who was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, in 1905. Theodore Roosevelt attended the ceremony. Later, when the president promoted him from captain to brigadier general over the heads of some 909 senior officers, many of those senior officers charged favoritism.⁴⁶

With the advent of problems on the Mexican border in 1913, Pershing received orders to return to the United States. After settling his wife, three daughters, and a son at the Presidio of San Francisco, he went to Fort Bliss, at El Paso, Texas, to take command of the 6th and 16th Infantry of the 8th Brigade. In the summer of 1915, Pershing learned that all his family except his six-year-old son had died in a fire at the Presidio.⁴⁷ After the tragedy, the army became his only existence.

Pershing assumed command of the Punitive Expedition, U.S.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 315-316.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 390.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 592-598.

Army, on 11 March 1916. His orders gave him authority to take only as large a force as needed to pursue and disperse Villa's band and to protect his own lines of communication.⁴⁸ Further instructions prevented him from using the Mexican rail system or entering cities. From the forces available--that is, those within the continental United States--Pershing assembled two columns for the expedition. The first column, to enter Mexico from the east, included the 13th Cavalry, the 6th and 16th Infantry Regiments, 1st Battalion, 4th Field artillery, with an attached battery from the 6th Field Artillery, and the 1st Aero Squadron, with 8 airplanes. The west column consisted of the 7th Cavalry, the 10th Cavalry, and one battery of the 6th Field Artillery.⁴⁹ Pershing also brought elements from the Signal Corps with radios to provide communications between his columns.⁵⁰

Although the United States government insisted that the expedition would operate with the cooperation of the Constitutionalist government and with the greatest respect for Mexican sovereignty, President Carranza never gave his approval. On 14 March, American intelligence reported that the commander of the Mexican border town of Palomas would use force against an American incursion. Although the Mexican commander offered no resistance when the expedition arrived,

⁴⁸Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 71.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁵⁰Pershing Papers, Box 372.

his threat reminded the Americans that the expedition would not be traveling through friendly country.⁵¹

While in Mexico, the expedition tried to maintain good relations with the Mexican people. However, incidents occurred that sorely tested Pershing as a field commander in a highly political situation. On 12 April, an American cavalry detachment of two troops, under the command of Major Tompkins, entered the city of Parral expecting to find food and forage. Instead they became the target of the anti-American wrath of the city's residents.⁵² When the local Carrancista commander lost control of his forces and they joined the attack on the Americans, he tried to help the Americans out of the city. Before extricating themselves, the Americans lost two men to Mexican bullets. The Americans, however, in their first real test of discipline under fire in Mexico, maintained cohesion and were able to withdraw.

Unable to catch Villa, the expedition evolved into a police action, with the goal of destroying of Villa's army. To accomplish this, Pershing divided the area of operations into five districts. Each district had a numbered cavalry responsible to track down and destroy Villista elements.⁵³

On the plains of the American west, or in the jungles of

⁵¹Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 74.

⁵²Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 266-267.

⁵³Pershing Papers, Box 372.

the Philippines, the army could conduct this type of operation in relative obscurity. Mexico, however, remained a sovereign nation, and Pershing could not always act as he saw best.⁵⁴ By June, Carranza's troops began to assume positions that threatened Pershing's lines of communications. With tensions high between the Americans and the Mexican federal troops, a clash became probable. At Carrizal, open fighting between American soldiers and Mexican federal troops became the hardest fight for the Americans in Mexico.

The incident began when an American cavalry force on a reconnaissance mission, under the command of Captain Charles T. Boyd, tried to force its way through the town.⁵⁵ The local Carrancista commander refused permission to let them through. Boyd hoped to teach the Mexicans a lesson, and perhaps gain a little glory, but instead led his men into defeat.⁵⁶ Against Mexican machine guns and superior numbers, the Americans began to fall back. A retreat turned into a rout when Boyd, followed by other officers, was killed.⁵⁷ Luckily, the Carrancistas did not leave the town to completely destroy the American force. Patrols dispatched by Pershing picked up small bands of the survivors wandering the Mexican plain for days after the

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 280-281.

⁵⁶Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 305.

⁵⁷Ibid.

battle. The Americans suffered a total of forty-four casualties to the Mexican's ninety-three.⁵⁸

After Carrizal, the American force did not venture beyond 150 miles south of the border. The chance of catching Villa himself in that area was slim. Although discouraged at the politically imposed stalemate, Pershing used this time to train his many green recruits. The training in Mexico proved to be invaluable to the army in less than a year. Pershing later credited his success in Europe to training in a war of movement received in Mexico.⁵⁹

While Pershing chased Villa's army into Chihuahua, another group of Mexican raiders decided to attack the towns of Glenn Springs, and Boquillas, Texas, near the Big Bend of the Rio Grande. On the night of 5-6 May, 1916, about one hundred Mexicans sacked the small town of Glenn Springs and killed a few of the American soldiers stationed there. Although hopelessly outnumbered, the soldiers managed to make the Mexicans work for their plunder. The Mexicans finally burned the roof of the building from which the soldiers fought and shot the Americans as they fled from the flames.

Early on the morning of the 6th, the raiders left Glenn Springs and headed down river about twelve miles to Boquillas, Texas, where another group of raiders had been busy since ten

⁵⁸Pershing Papers, Box 372.

⁵⁹John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1:11.

that morning. From there the two groups headed back to Mexico with plunder and captives. Overburdened with goods, the Mexicans commandeered a truck. When the poor road conditions prevented the truck from keeping pace with the horse-borne men, the captured Americans operating the truck were able to overpower their Mexican guards and head back to the United States.

After this raid, two companies of the 8th Cavalry from Fort Bliss entered Mexico to search for the raiders. With 100 men, one forage truck, a pair of Ford sedans, and a Cadillac touring car, the new detachment mirrored Pershing's main effort, only on a smaller scale. The expedition soon ran into the same problems with transportation that the raiders had. The cars and the truck fell miles behind the horse cavalry. Except as a way to haul grain for the horses, the motorized transport held little advantage on the rutted dirt roads of Mexico. After two weeks and two hundred miles, the tired and thirsty troopers returned to Texas after taking five prisoners and leaving behind a few dead bandits.⁶⁰

News of the new raids placed an even larger burden on the already overextended United States Army. General Scott sent Secretary Baker a message stating that at least 150,000 more troops were needed to protect the border. In response, the president called out the National Guard of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The small numbers of National Guardsmen

⁶⁰Mason, The Great Pursuit, pp. 167-181.

responding, however, failed to solve the problem. Arizona could call up only 907 Guardsmen, New Mexico 972, and Texas 3,381. Traditionally devoted to Combat Arms--branches whose mission was fighting rather than support--the Guard units were comprised mostly of infantry, with two batteries of field artillery and one cavalry squadron.⁶¹ The combat arms carried more prestige, so when groups or influential individuals had formed companies of organized militia, they almost always chose a combat arms branch. Also, for the traditional uses for militia--suppression of a strike or riot close to home--large support functions would be of little use. On the border the National Guard learned that if it was to become part of the army, it needed to provide more support units for extended operations.

In response to the dismal showing of Guardsmen from the border states, on 18 June President Wilson called out the entire National Guard of the United States for service on the Mexican border. This brought the total of Guardsmen in federal service on the border to over 110,000 by late summer.⁶² These augmented the over 35,000 Regular Army soldiers that Secretary Baker ordered to the border in June. The effort on the Mexican

⁶¹John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), p. 151.

⁶²Ibid. President Wilson called out the National Guard through the state governors. The total Guardsmen mobilized was 123,605 enlisted and 8,589 officers. This was 97,350 men short of the Guard's authorized war strength, but only 4,083 short of its peacetime strength.

border left the continental United States without any troops to spare. For practical purposes, all troops not in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, or anywhere else overseas, were on the border or in Mexico.

Although forbidden by law from crossing the Rio Grande, the National Guardsmen benefitted from border duties. Along with the experience of camp life and adjusting to full time service, more important lessons were learned. Officers learned supply could often take more time and effort than all other duties. The Guardsmen also learned that membership in their local militia company could sometimes mean more than a weekly lost evening or call-up for a local problem.⁶³ Even so, General Scott thought the National Guard would still need six months of training to be combat-ready.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the Regular Army was learning many of the same lessons regarding supply and transport. However, they operated deep in Mexico, where communication problems and political difficulties added to the problems. The aero squadron--the first American military use of airplanes--performed poorly and well below expectations. Vastly under-funded compared to European air forces, the American Army could bring only eight Jennies for reconnaissance into Mexico. Mechanical problems and reoccurring troubles with cracked propellers dropped the

⁶³Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 287-288.

⁶⁴Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 152.

number of usable aircraft to two by 20 April.⁶⁵ Later the army sent these back to Columbus. The poor showing of American air power in the Mexican campaign helped destroy the notion that the army needed only a few planes.

Other problems surfaced. Many cavalry horses died from the trip to the border. Pushed into service without a proper quarantine or acclimatization, the horses fell victim to the Mexican heat. The sudden change in diet increased their susceptibility to disease.⁶⁶ The McClellan saddle, a sort of miniature hammock the cavalry used, caused many of the men to complain of back pains after long days of riding. The saddle also made carrying a saber and rifle awkward. As a result, many of the soldiers discarded their sabers, which they found obsolete anyway.⁶⁷ However, sabers and even horses, as the European armies were discovering, had passed from usefulness in combat. The machine gun and rifle forced the soldier in combat to seek cover, rather than present a target high on horseback. Denied the use of Mexican railroads, the army continued to rely on animal transport for moving men and supplies across the plains of Chihuahua. However, every horse or mule became another mouth to feed. Gasoline was cheaper

⁶⁵Pershing Papers, Box 372.

⁶⁶Clyde E. Hawkins, "What Horse for the Cavalry," Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 28 (July, 1917), 100.

⁶⁷Charles D. Rhodes, "Notes on Cavalry Equipment," Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 28 (July, 1917), 82-90.

than oats. Although the horse would be important for army logistics in Mexico, its replacement in that role had surfaced in the motor vehicles brought to Mexico with the expedition.

The automobile made its debut with the United States Army during the Punitive Expedition. Pershing brought six as staff cars. American truck manufacturers also began sending trucks for the army's use. The army quickly learned which domestic truck manufacturers produced a reliable product. However, the new Jeffrey Quads, Whites, Packards, and Locomobiles needed experienced drivers, few of which existed within the army.⁶⁸ Drivers had to be trained. Although the trucks were originally intended for logistics, soldiers quickly found new uses for them such as troop movements and reconnaissance. The limits of wheeled vehicles became apparent as well. The trucks also showed the necessity for improved roads. Most roads soon became impassible from ruts. With few good roads in Mexico, the army had to build many of its own roads, greatly delaying the impact of the trucks.

Despite the constant need to adapt to new technology, some soldiers found change difficult to accept. Although the saber proved as useless in Mexico, at least one professional soldier still championed it. While still on the Mexican expedition, Second Lieutenant Patton published an article

⁶⁸Vandiver, Black Jack, p. 612.

defending the saber in the Cavalry Journal.⁶⁹ To Patton, the lack of use for the saber in Mexico reflected only the nature of that particular campaign, and in no way foreshadowed any new development. To Patton, the lack of news from the European war on cavalry operations, which to him were synonymous with the saber, reflected only the reporters' lack of knowledge in military matters. Deeply enamored with the French cult of elan, Patton urged the continued reliance on the saber to give the cavalry the glory it needed to perform its mission. Clearly Patton had not yet met the tank.

The problems on the border caused by the Mexican Revolution gave the army the opportunity to try other new ideas. An exercise conducted on the Texas side of the border on 6 October 1916, began the United States Army's attempt to find the proper role for motor vehicles in combat.⁷⁰ With fifty Regular Army and National Guard officers watching, the army conducted a series of exercises to see if truck-borne infantry could overcome a retreating enemy. Aside from basic findings such as the need to mount a machine gun on every vehicle in case of ambush, the exercise was part of the long process of replacing the horse with machines. Although the ultimate finding of the exercise was the usefulness of trucks

⁶⁹George S. Patton Jr., "A Defense of the Saber," Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 27 (July 1916), 48-50.

⁷⁰Brigadier General James Parker, "Cavalry and Auto Trucks," Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 27 (July 1916), 349-360.

for supply of horse-mounted cavalry, in Europe the movement of supplies became the last mission for the horse in modern war, as tanks and trucks slowly proved more efficient on the battlefield. The United States Army had already discovered the limits of the horse in Mexico.

The experiences of the American Expeditionary Force in Mexico altered the army. General Pershing, as well as other leaders, gained valuable experience of handling large bodies of men in a delicate political environment.⁷¹ Both the practical and mechanical problems of motor vehicles became apparent, as did the inadequacy of America's air power.

Perhaps most important, the government saw the inadequacy of the National Guard as then structured. The long debate over the relationship between the Regular Army and the nation's second line of defense set the parameters for potential change and suggested remedies for potential problems, but it failed to spur action. The hypothetical threats raised during the preparedness debate could not bring the government or the army to address the weaknesses in the Regular Army or National Guard. Problems on the Mexican border, however, presented a very real problem. The Mexican border crisis forced the United States to alter fundamentally the relationship between state forces and the Regular Army.

By February 1917, Germany had pushed Mexico off the front

⁷¹Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 294-295.

pages of American newspapers. With Pershing largely successful in his attempt to rid northern Mexico of Villista elements, and with the growing threat of war against the Central Powers, the president pulled the expedition out of Mexico.⁷² By then the remaining Villistas and the Mexican federal government under Carranza had again taken arms against each other. The internal Mexican fighting made an alliance between Mexico and Germany unlikely and enabled the United States to mobilize against the Central Powers without fear for its southern border.

⁷²Ibid, pp. 293-294.

IV. Adoption of the National Defense Act of 1916

As the bulk of the Regular Army and National Guard learned its lessons in the heat of the American Southwest and in northern Mexico, Congress began to create a new law that would better allow the army to respond to the changes in its mission since the era of the Founding Fathers. The final product, the National Defense Act of 1916, bore the imprint of the preparedness debate, the experience in Mexico, the lobbying power of the National Guard Officers Association, and the ghost of Emory Upton. Once the Act became law, the original concept of the relationship between the Regular Army and Organized Militia--supplanted by the National Guard--was fundamentally changed.

At the start of the twentieth century, partisans of reform grappled with the problem of how to create a military force that would be competent in wartime yet not be dangerous to liberty in peacetime. The United States Volunteers, not specified in the Constitution, had been the vehicle to expand the military during wartime for a century.¹ However, the

¹Volunteer Act of 1861. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 9.

system had serious pitfalls. The Sand Creek Massacre, fought by the "Bloody Third" Colorado Cavalry of US Volunteers, illustrated the drawbacks of using 100 day recruits to wage war. John J. Chivington, a political ally of the territorial governor, led the Third Colorado. Recruited for the specific purpose of fighting Indians during the Civil War, the Third attacked Black Kettles's band of Cheyennes, which had already surrendered. When the Coloradans were done, "some two hundred Cheyenne corpses, about two-thirds women and children, littered the valley of Sand Creek."² Hungry for glory, the short-term recruits behaved like men playing soldier, rather than as true soldiers.

Following the Spanish-American War, military planners realized that the system needed change. However, with Theodore Roosevelt and his Volunteer Rough Riders receiving popular credit for the defeat of Spain, no one wanted to hear about the Regular Army units, especially the units of black soldiers, that cleared the way for his famous charge. Americans retained their traditional disdain for Regulars and continued to champion the amateur soldiers. When the Regulars were also black, they became invisible to the public. The concept of the war-time Volunteer as the real military strength of the republic remained entrenched in popular imagination, if not in fact.

²Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890 (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 89-93.

Americans in 1916, no less than their predecessors in 1789, tended to distrust a large standing army and to place great faith in the civilians who took up arms when war began. The Minutemen of Lexington and Concord so captured the public imagination that many forgot that General Washington had to assemble, train, and maintain the Continental Army of regulars in order to win independence from Britain. After the war, Americans convinced themselves that a mythical citizen-soldiery won the war rather than accept that the republic owed a great debt to the professional soldiers for securing independence.³

Although the concept of United States Volunteers captured the public's imagination, the decades following the Civil War witnessed a resurgence of interest in organized militia. Many believed that the great casualties in the Civil War reflected the relative inexperience of the Volunteer units, and more particularly that of their officers. Men died needlessly until officers learned the trade of war. Advocates of the militia saw the solution in organized companies of militia that drilled regularly in peacetime and which could then assist the Regular Army in war.⁴

³Royster, A Revolutionary People at War. As part of his basic thesis, Royster argues that revolutionary rhetoric of the nation-in-arms failed to arouse the American people for the prolonged war against Britain, forcing leaders to rely on the Continental Army.

⁴John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 108-114.

Given the need for organized units and training, the resurgent organized militia--or as it was increasingly called, National Guard--maintained in every state, began to wrest from the Volunteers the official role as the nation's second line of defense. The Guard already had units in existence. Moreover, unlike partisans of the Volunteers, advocates of the militia had a strong Constitutional argument. Tracing their ancestry to the 1630s, the militia far antedated the United States Army. The Founding Fathers considered the militia and the army as separate institutions. Article I, section 10, of the Constitution stated that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress...keep troops...", but in the oft quoted second amendment, the Constitution guaranteed the right of the states to keep "[a] well regulated militia...". However, Article II, section 3 established the president as the Commander-in Chief of the militia when in federal service. Clearly, the framers intended that the militia would be called into federal service when needed.

The Regular Army, however, had little but contempt for the militia. Although not published until January 1904, copies of Major General Emory Upton's book, The Military Policy of the United States, had been passed around the War Department for years before publication.⁵ Regular Army officers quoted Upton's book as gospel. The book reflected Upton's infatuation with the Prussian military. The Uptonites believed that state

⁵Ambrose, Upton and the Army, pp. 151-154.

control of militia would always make it useless as a reserve force. To Upton's disciples, the answer was a federally controlled reserve force, independent of state meddling. The organized militia, even if called 'National Guard,' was still fundamentally a state force and therefore worthless to the Regular Army.⁶

The Regulars had a good argument. Until the Militia Act of 1903, the federal army and militia units had little standardization. Each state, territory, and the District of Columbia, had its own uniforms, training programs, and organization. To integrate this polyglot of militia into federal service was practically impossible. The Militia Act of 1903--called "the Dick Act" after the bill's sponsor, Charles F. Dick--sought to correct this.⁷ The Dick Act was the first exercise of power over the militia by Congress since 1792. The Militia Act of 1792 required all males between 18 and 45 years of age to arm themselves and attend an annual muster.⁸ Most people ignored the law, as did the state and federal governments.⁹ By the time of the War of 1812, the Jeffersonian

⁶Ibid., p. 154.

⁷Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, p. 26. The bill's sponsor was General Charles F. Dick, Chairman of the Senate Militia Committee, president of the National Guard Association, and Commanding General of the Ohio National Guard.

⁸Militia Act of 1792. Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 33. sec. 1.

⁹Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard, pp. 81-83.

ideal of the general militia of all able-bodied male citizens had been abandoned.¹⁰ After the Civil War, however, local groups, usually including many veterans, began to take militia training seriously.¹¹ Although still called militia in most states, these constituted the real beginning of the National Guard. The Dick Act gave official recognition to the term 'National Guard' for the organized militia of the states.¹² At the time, most militia units drilled one evening a week, although attendance varied widely, and some units seldom drilled at all. The Dick Act authorized federal funds for at least two mandatory drills per month.¹³ Guard units had to hold a minimum number of target practices every year.¹⁴ The 1903 Act also required militia units to spend short periods in the field annually.¹⁵ Each state's militia had to follow the Regular Army in organization, equipment, and discipline.¹⁶ The planners hoped the changes would mold the National Guard into

¹⁰Cress, Citizens in Arms, p. 176.

¹¹Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 15-16.

¹²Militia Act of 1903. Fifty-seventh Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 196. sec 1.

¹³Ibid., sec. 18. This part of the act stipulated that each unit would hold not less than 24 drills per year. Drill normally consisted of a weekly two-hour period on a weekday evening.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., The annual training period had to include at least five days of field training.

¹⁶Ibid., sec. 3.

an effective reserve force that the federal army could use.

The Militia Act of 1903, however, contained many clauses that severely weakened it. State governors retained the right to authorize or to deny their state's unit for federal service. Even with the governor's consent, individual Guardsmen needed to volunteer for federal service; they could not be drafted against their will.¹⁷ In addition, federal service could not extend beyond nine months.¹⁸ Finally, no federal agency, including the army, had the authority to remove militia officers, no matter how incompetent they were.¹⁹ Amendments to the Militia Act of 1903 in 1908 gave the president the right to prescribe the length of time militia units could spend in federal service, although individual Guardsmen could not be forced to serve past existing enlistments or commissions.²⁰

The changes of 1908 further provided that the National Guard could be ordered for service "either within or without

¹⁷Gene Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1966), p. 310. However, section 7 of the 1903 act seems to dispute this. But the Militia Act of 1908, Sixtieth Congress, session II. chapter 204, sec 43, supports the notion of federal control only at the governor's consent.

¹⁸Militia Act of 1903, sec. 5.

¹⁹Ibid., sec. 8. The law stated that only militia officers could serve on courts-martials for officers and men of the National Guard for offenses while in federal service.

²⁰Militia Act of 1908. Sixtieth Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 204. sec. 5. This amendment gave the president the power to keep militiamen in federal service as long as the president required rather than the nine month limit of the Act of 1903.

the Territory of the United States."²¹ However in 1912, the Attorney General ruled that sending National Guard units outside of United States territory violated the Constitution.²² This led to incidents such as one in which the Virginia National Guard, in federal service on the Mexican border in 1916, would ride their mounts up to the Mexican bank of the Rio Grande by the town of Matamoros, but not would leave the river.²³

In 1910, the United States Army General Staff finally developed a plan to integrate the state militia into the federal army during national emergencies. At that time, the Regular Army was scattered throughout the continental United States in battalions occupying some forty-nine posts left from the days of the Indian Wars.²⁴ Most of the posts held little or no military value and remained active for the economic benefit of the local community. In addition, the War

²¹Militia Act of 1908, sec 5.

²²Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in Relation to Their Official Duties, George Kearney, ed. (Washington: GPO, 1913), 29:322-329. In a reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of War, Attorney General George W. Wickersham ruled that the militia, regardless of its name, could only be used for the constitutionally sanctioned purposes: suppression of insurrection, repelling of invasion, or execution of laws. The militia could only leave United States territory in pursuit of an invading army.

²³John Listman, "Old Dominion's Wartime Maneuvers Along the Rio Grande," The National Guard Magazine 46 (May 1992), 45.

²⁴William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (Ashton Maryland: Eric Lunberg, 1964), p. 68.

Department posted a large minority of the Regular Army in America's newly acquired overseas possessions: The Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Hawai'i, Guam, Alaska, and the Philippines. For internal police duties, such as Indian uprisings and labor unrest, this arrangement worked. But as Wounded Knee receded into the past, and the Spanish-American War brought America into the first ranks of world power, this arrangement became a liability.

For an army to be effective against another army, it must be concentrated. Toward that end, the General Staff developed a plan for the Regular Army to form three divisions.²⁵ The General Staff hoped that the changes would allow larger formations to train together. This plan failed due to lack of funds to implement it. In 1912, the army developed a plan for the Regular Army to form four permanent divisions and the National Guard to form twelve divisions.²⁶ However this was only an administrative change; no troops were moved and the army remained scattered in small posts.

In 1911, before the first plan was fully implemented, fear of trouble on the Mexican border caused by the revolution forced the War Department to develop an alternative plan. General Wood hastily formed a "maneuver division" of Regular Army units and sent it to the border. This mobilization

²⁵Ibid., p. 437.

²⁶Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard, p. 145.

demonstrated the weakness of the army. None of the units arrived at the border fully armed or at full strength. The army stripped units not part of the maneuver division to fill those that went. Assembly took longer than planned, and the War Department soon disbanded the division.²⁷ In February of 1913, a mobilization on the Texas border by the Regular Army's Second Division met with more success due to reforms in planning made after the fiasco in 1911.²⁸

In the amendment to the Dick Act in 1914, the National Guard Officers Association received designation for the Guard as the nation's second line of defense. Guardsmen still had to volunteer for federal service as individuals, but the president had to accept any unit with over three-quarters of its members volunteering. Guardsmen had to volunteer as individuals due to the constitutional barriers of using militia beyond the borders of the United States. In wartime, the president had to accept all National Guard units that volunteered before he could accept any US Volunteers.²⁹

By 1915, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison developed a plan for a reserve force to replace the National Guard as the country's main augmentation of the Regular Army. Convinced that state control of Guard units would always hamper their

²⁷Weigley, History of United States Army, pp. 334-335.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Volunteer Act of 1914. Sixty-third Congress. Sess. I. Ch, 71. sec. 3.

usefulness, Garrison planned a federal military reserve that he called, in a political move to link it with patriotism and the Founding Fathers, a Continental Army. This force was to have between 400,000 and 500,000 men.³⁰ Basically, Garrison's plan copied George Washington's plan for a federal militia.

President Wilson supported this plan at first. During a speech on 4 November 1915, the President called for a moderate increase of the Regular Army, a strengthened National Guard, and a 400,000 man Continental Army.³¹ Completely under federal control, members of the Continental Army were to be civilian volunteers who trained in summer camps. The plan met with bitter resistance from the National Guard Officers Association, which correctly feared it as an attempt to shuffle the Guard into obscurity. Many Southern Congressmen feared that blacks would join in large numbers and so opposed the idea.³² When Garrison testified before the House committee, he admitted that many of the men for the Continental Army would most likely come from the National Guard, but as the Guard and Regular Army could not recruit to strength, the government would probably need to draft soldiers for the new reserve. This killed the plan for the immediate future.³³ Although not included in the 1916 Act, the concept

³⁰Clifford, Citizens in Arms, p. 118.

³¹Ibid., p. 123.

³²Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, p. 51.

³³Ibid., p. 125-127.

of the Continental Army was later realized as the Army Reserve after World War II.

Another idea from the period, which did become part of the Act, was the Officer Training Camps movement. From the summer of 1913, the army had conducted a series of Student Military Training Camps. Students from the nation's colleges and universities spent four or more weeks, depending on the year, learning basic military skills. Each student paid for his uniform and meals. After completing the course, his training with the army finished, each "veteran" was expected to spread the gospel of military preparedness.³⁴

Related to the summer camps was military instruction at land-grant colleges. The Morrill Act of 1863 required that all the land-grant colleges teach courses in military tactics.³⁵ Some, such as Norwich University in Vermont and the Virginia Military Institute, conducted highly credible programs. At the majority of schools, however, the training was considered a boring joke by the students and the equivalent of exile by the officer-instructors. Moreover, the War Department kept no record of students with military training once these students had graduated from college.³⁶ Major General Leonard Wood, the army Chief of Staff, who earned his commission through the

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Morrill Act. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 130, sec. 4.

³⁶Gene M. Lyons, and John W. Masland, "The Origins of the ROTC," Military Affairs 23 (Spring 1959), 1-12.

Medical Corps and not West Point, began to agitate for cooperation between the War and Interior Departments for standardization of the instruction at land-grant colleges. He also hoped to give provisional commissions, what today would be called Reserve Commissions, to the honor graduates, who, after a year of active training in the Regular Army, would form an officers reserve.

In 1916, as a result of the shortcomings exposed by the response to Villa's raids and the threat of war in Europe, Congress passed the National Defense Act. This was the last restructuring of the military before entry into the Great War. Through it, the government tried to correct many of the shortcomings of the Militia Act of 1903. Under the Act of 1903, the status of the National Guard remained unclear. Although it was the first reserve of the army, legally it remained militia and was therefore limited to the territorial United States. The experience of the Guardsmen reacting to the raids by Mexican revolutionaries highlighted this problem. The National Defense Act of 1916 fundamentally altered the relationship of the organized militia, the National Guard, when called into federal service. The new law defined the Army of the United States as consisting of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard when in federal Service. In truth, only the Regular Army and the National Guard actually existed. The combat arms of the Regular Army

consisted of 64 regiments of infantry, 26 regiments of cavalry, 21 regiments of field artillery, and a coast artillery corps. The total authorized enlisted force for the Regular Army consisted of a peacetime strength of not more than 175,000 men, not counting the Philippine Scouts, Medical Department, Quartermaster, signal corps, and unassigned recruits.³⁷ The president could augment the Regular Army with the organized state militia for the duration of the national emergency as in the changes of 1908.³⁸ Also, the 1916 act brought the Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United States Army closer to the Regular Army. The organization, grades, and numbers of men and officers had to conform to Regular Army standards.³⁹

Under the 1916 Act, the training camps of General Wood received official support from Congress. The law specifically gave the Secretary of War the authorization to hold the camps. The federal government assumed the cost of uniforms, transportation, subsistence, and equipment for the trainees.⁴⁰ During the Great War, these camps provided the majority of the line officers for the greatly expanded army. Candidates

³⁷National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 2.

³⁸Ibid., sec 3. This was done by requiring all officers and men of the National Guard to take a new oath swearing to defend the United States as well as their home state. Upon federalization, all Guardsmen were discharged from the National Guard and became Volunteers in the federal army.

³⁹Ibid., sec. 21.

⁴⁰Ibid., sec. 24.

underwent an intensive ninety days of training to prepare them as officers in a specific branch. These camps were the direct forbear of the modern Officer Candidate School.⁴¹

The new law also gave the president authorization to continue the Reserve Officers Training Corps--R.O.T.C.--at all land-grant colleges.⁴² Perhaps more important, the Act gave the president the authority to expand the R.O.T.C. program to non-Land-Grant schools.⁴³ Reflecting another idea of General Wood, the Act instituted the practice of provisional commissions for new officers who were not graduates of the United States Military Academy. Under the Act, honor graduates from R.O.T.C. programs could serve on active duty for two years with a provisional commission. If a holder of such a commission proved competent after two years, he could receive a permanent commission and remain on active duty.⁴⁴

Section 57 of the Act reasserted the right of the federal government to conscript into the military. Wilson claimed that when the Republic declared war, the citizens had in effect all volunteered for military service.⁴⁵ The new law put this idea

⁴¹Ernest R. Dupuy and Trever N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p. 358.

⁴²Ibid., sec. 40-52. Section 52 gave the authority for R.O.T.C. graduates to spend six months, not the full year envisioned by General Woods, on active duty for training.

⁴³Ibid., secs. 40-42.

⁴⁴Ibid., sec. 23.

⁴⁵Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, p. 49.

into legal form. "All able bodied male citizens of the United States" and those intending to become citizens, between the ages of 18 and 45, were declared to comprise the militia of the United States. Men not in the Regular Army, or their state's organized militia (National Guard) or naval militia, formed the so-called unorganized militia.⁴⁶ This meant, that as residents of a democracy whose elected officials declared either a war or other emergency, they were eligible for military service. By electing the men who declared war, the population already volunteered for active military service.

Another section standardized the number of Guardsmen in each state. Within one year of passage of the act, each state was to have 200 enlisted men for each senator and representative that the state sent to Congress. The president received the authority to decide the number of Guardsmen each territory and the District of Columbia could have. After the first year, the plan called for the number of Guardsmen to increase by fifty percent each year until the number of enlisted Guardsmen reached at least 800 per Congressman in each state.⁴⁷ As the Guard units were already under strength, the possibility of recruiting to higher strengths was not likely. However, with the United States formally at peace, Congress hoped to provide a reserve force without resorting to the conscription implicit in the plan for the Continental

⁴⁶National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 57.

⁴⁷Ibid., sec. 62.

Army.

The new law also integrated the National Guard into the War Department. The army had created a National Militia Board to advise the army on militia matters in 1908.⁴⁸ The new law superseded this, moving militia affairs up to bureau level. The Chief of this new Militia Bureau was also ex-officio a member of the General Staff Corps.⁴⁹ Recognizing the need for closer relations between the Regular Army and the National Guard, the new law provided for 822 extra officers and 100 extra sergeants from the combat arms of the Regular Army to serve one-year tours with the National Guard as instructors.⁵⁰ In a move that allowed the War Department better to integrate the National Guard into war plans, the president received the authority to decide which types of Guard units states were to maintain. Prior to this, National Guard companies adopted whatever branch they fancied. After the Act of 1916, the army could decide whether a Guard unit would be cavalry, artillery, supply, or whatever the army needed.⁵¹

The Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps existed only on paper. Only sixteen enlisted men joined

⁴⁸Ibid., sec. 81. This section states that the National Militia Board was created by the Act of 27 May, 1908, amending section 20 of the Act of 21 January 1903.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., secs. 25, 36. Section 25 covers the extra officers, and section 36 covers the extra sergeants.

⁵¹Ibid., sec. 197.

the Enlisted Reserve Corps.⁵² These reserves differed greatly from the Army Reserve of today. Instead of reserve units to augment the army during mobilization, the Enlisted Reserve Corps was more akin to the modern Individual Ready Reserve--a list of trained veterans who could be called back into the Regular Army in times of crisis. The proposed Enlisted Reserve Corps was not a corps at all. Instead, it consisted of individual soldiers released early from active duty with liability for recall into the Regular Army during mobilization.⁵³ Unlike the modern Army Reserve, the members of the Enlisted reserve Corps did not form any units and did not train.

The Officers Reserve Corps filled General Wood's desire for a plan to retain the services of college graduates with officer training. Graduates of the summer training camps and R.O.T.C. would then enter into the Officers Reserve Corps. Under the Act, during wartime the reserve officers would serve in the Regular Army, and work in support roles such as the Quarter Master, staff, and recruit rendezvous and depots. In addition, reserve officers were supposed to provide officers for the Volunteer units, the old standby.⁵⁴ The Volunteer Army would consist of large units of either volunteers or conscripts enlisted in time of war. The Continental Army idea

⁵²Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, p. 10.

⁵³National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 55.

⁵⁴Ibid, sec. 37.

disappeared.

The response of the Regular Army reflected its experiences in Mexico and on the border. The Cavalry Journal ran an editorial praising the final compromise bill.⁵⁵ Of course, the provisions providing for an increase in the cavalry branch brought the highest praise, which it directly linked to the "activities of one Pancho Villa."⁵⁶ It also approved of the incorporation of a machine gun troop into each regiment of cavalry. Again this showed the influence of the experiences of the expeditionary force in Mexico. The Journal agreed with the provision to spread the increases in manpower over a five year period, because it thought that the quality of the army would suffer from a sudden large increase. In reality, of course, an increase larger and more rapid than anything dreamed of was less than a year away.⁵⁷ At the time, however, the Journal feared that the increases would stop after the first year. The Journal believed that Congress planned only to increase the army for the immediate threat on the Mexican border, rather than as a long-term plan for increasing the strength of the army.

Democracies, for better or worse, tend to move slowly unless an actual emergency arises. During the national debate

⁵⁵Editor's Table, "The Army Bill," The Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 27 (July 1916), 151-154.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 151.

⁵⁷National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 24.

over preparedness, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan said that "the president knows that if this country needed a million men, and needed them in a day, the call would go out at sunrise and the sun would go down on a million men in arms."⁵⁸ Unfortunately, in modern warfare, a million men put under arms in a day would be at best an armed rabble, and at worst cannon fodder to be slaughtered by professional armies. Although unknown to both Congress and the army at the time, the American declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary was less than a year away and would occur before many of the changes took place. The National Defense Act of 1916 did, however, lay the basis for the United States to mobilize and field over three million men during the year and a half the United States was at war with the Central Powers.

⁵⁸Merle Eugen Curti, Bryan and World Peace (Northhampton Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, Vol.16, no. 3-4, 1931), p. 233.

V. Conclusion

The National Defense Act of 1916, a compromise of various needs and interests, fundamentally altered the military establishment. What the Civil War was to the increased centralization of governmental power, the 1916 Act was to military power. State influence in military affairs would continue, but the balance had shifted decisively in the federal government's favor. The remainder of the twentieth century would witness a continuation of the trend solidified in 1916.

America's military involvement in the Mexican Revolution, the preparedness debate, and the war in Europe, all served to convince Americans to abandon the archaic model of national defense inherited from the revolutionary generation. The Founding Fathers reached a compromise intended to ensure defense of the nation without resorting to militarism. The result fully satisfied neither the proponents of state sovereignty nor advocates of a more centralized republic. However the system outlasted its framers. In the pre-industrialized era, no potential adversary had the ability to cross the ocean and attack without lengthy preparation that also would have given the United States adequate time to

prepare.

Great Britain, America's traditional enemy throughout much of the period before the twentieth century, provided the only exception. The War of 1812 amply demonstrated the weaknesses of America's defense system, yet the results also showed the strengths of the decentralization of the United States. The capture and destruction of the capital by Britain did not mean victory for Britain. In addition, the army and militia occasionally proved adequate for defense. Moreover, the refusal of the militia to enter Canada reinforced the idea that a citizens' militia prevented adventurism and ensured that the military could be used only for defense. Despite the limitations in the system, it served the government adequately throughout the nineteenth century.

By 1914, however, the nation had changed considerably. America's flirtation with imperialism at the turn of the century left the army with additional missions far removed from the continental United States. With Europe at war and direct United States involvement looming as a possibility, the whole military establishment found itself overtaxed responding to a small raid on the country's southern border. Although the changes of 1903 and 1916 did not adequately prepare the army for world war, they did overcome the constitutional limits of a state-based second line of defense.¹ In the decade and a

¹When the United States entered the Great War, the Regular Army provided the 1st through 25th Divisions, the National Guard provided 26 through 50, and the remaining

half between the end of the Spanish-American War, and the National Defense Act of 1916, the militia of the colonial period evolved into a very different creation.

The modern National Guard replaced both the old militia and the Volunteers. With the dual oath or enlistment for Guardsmen, the Guard became able to accompany the Regular Army in any theater in the world. Although states continued to have an influence in their Guard units, that influence waned throughout the century. The defeat in federal courts of an attempt in 1987-88 by the governors of Minnesota, Massachusetts, and other states to prevent their states' National Guard units from attending annual training exercises in Honduras underscored the point.² State governments had become little more than cheerleaders for their National Guard units in federal service. Governors held command over their state National Guard only when the unit was not in federal service. During the Great War this led to a dilemma: with the states' only organized militia--the National Guard--liable for service outside the United States, states were left in wartime without a force for traditional militia functions. To prevent a recurrence of the situation, Congress amended the National Defense Act of 1916 during 1940, when the National Guard was

divisions were designated as "National Army." Although the president could accept three Divisions of US Volunteers, President Wilson did not exercise this right.

²Patrick Todd Mullins "The Militia Clause, the National Guard, and Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War," George Washington Law Review 57 (December 1988), 328-329.

federalized for a year of training. Under the amendment, the states received specific permission to form an organized militia separate from the National Guard and not subject to federal service. This new State Guard would fill the state role of the National Guard while the National Guard was in federal service.³ Most states created a State Guard during the Second World War, while increasingly relying on the new institution of the state police during peacetime. Traditional militia functions of suppressing riots and maintaining order became civil rather than military function.⁴

The watershed came in the years between the Spanish-American War and America's entry into the Great War. Those years saw the abandonment of the militia system as inherited from the Revolutionary generation and the creation of a new system of defense. The National Defense Act of 1916 established, with only minor modification, the relationship between the regular and reserve components of the United States Army for the rest of the twentieth century.

³United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, The Home Guard, (Washington: GPO, 1944). This report deals with the amendment to section 16 of the National Defense Act of 1916, which allowed states to create a non-National Guard organized militia. Usually referred to as "State Guards," units were activated in most states for state duties during the Second World War, and revised as a paper force during the Korean War.

⁴Little work has been done on the State Guards. The most in-depth study is the Historical Evaluation & Research Organization's US Home Defense Forces Study, prepared under contract for the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1981.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anglo-American Antimilitary Tracts 1697-1830. Kohn, Richard H., ed. New York: Arno Press, 1979.
- The Complete Anti-federalist. Vol I, Storing, Herbert J., ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
From this was taken: "Articles of Confederation," pp. 101-109 and "Constitution of the United States," pp. 110-123
- The Federalist Papers. Isaac Kramnick ed., New York: Penguin Books, 1987.
- Journals of the Continental Congress. Washington: General Services Administration, National Archives and Record Service, 1976
- Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in relation to Their Official Duties. Kearney, George, ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913.
- Papers of Alexander Hamilton. Syrett, Harold C., ed., Cooke, Jacob E., assist. ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
- The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series. Abbot, W.W., ed. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992.
- The Papers of John J. Pershing. Library of Congress, Washington DC.
- The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vols 27 & 36 1913. Link, Arthur S., ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- The Patton Papers 1885-1940. Blumenson, Martin, ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.
- State Department Documents Related to the Internal affairs of Mexico 1910-1920.
- War Department Document Number 32, "The Organized Militia of the United States," Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897.

The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799. George Washington Bicentennial Commission, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Statutes

Militia Act of 1792; 'An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing a Uniform Militia throughout the United States.' pp. 271-274, also, 'An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.' pp. 264-265.

Militia Act of 1793; 'An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform militia throughout the United States.' pp. 271-274.

Militia Act of 1795; 'An Act to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the Act now in force for those purposes.' pp. 424-425.

from The Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol 1, Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1848.

Volunteer Act of 1806; 'An Act authorizing a detachment from the Militia of the United States.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol. 2, pp. 383-384. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845.

Volunteer Act of 1861; 'An Act To authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting private property.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol. 12, pp. 268-269. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1863.

Morrill Act; 'An Act donating Public Lands to the several States and Territories which may provide Colleges for the benefit of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1863.

Militia Act of 1903; 'An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol 32, part 1, pp. 774-780. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1904.

Militia Act of 1908; 'An Act To further amend the Act entitles "An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes." approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol 35, part 1, pp. 399-403 Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1909.

Volunteer Act of 1914; 'An Act To provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol. 38, part 1, pp. 347. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1915.

National Defense Act of 1916; 'An Act for making further and more effectual provisions for the National Defense, and for other purposes.' Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Vol 39, part 1, pp. 166-217. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1917.

Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Braddy, Haldeen. Pershing's Mission in Mexico. El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1966.

Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of an Anglo-American Conflict. Cambridge: The University Press, 1968.

Carter, William Harding. The American Army. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1915.

Chambers, John Whiteclay II. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America. New York: The Free Press, 1987.

Clark, Emmons. History of the Seventh Regiment of New York, 1806-1889. New York: 1890.

Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border. London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969.

Clendenen, Clarence C. The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961.

- Clifford, John Garry. The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972.
- Coffman, Edward M. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Cress, Lawrence Delbert. Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
- Curti, Merle Eugen. Bryan and World Peace. Northhampton Mass: Smith College Studies in History, Vol.16, no. 3-4, 1931.
- Derthick, Martha. The National Guard in Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Dickson, Harris. The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself as Recorded in Uncle Sam's Own Words. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1917.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest. The Compact History of the United States Army. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1956.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest. The National Guard: A Compact History. New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1971.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dupuy, Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dupuy, Trevor N. Military Heritage of America. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. Intervention!: The United States and the Mexican Revolution 1913-1917. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993.
- Ganoe, William Addleman. The History of the United States Army. Ashton Maryland: Eric Lundberg, 1964.
- Gurney, Gene. A Pictorial History of the United States Army. New York: Crown Publishers Inc, 1966.
- Hagedorn, Hermann. Leonard Wood: A Biography. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931.
- Haley, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico 1910-1917. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1970.

- Hall, Linda B. Alvaro Obregon: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981.
- Hall, Linda B. and Coerver, Don M. Revolution on the Border: The United States and Mexico 1910-1920. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988.
- Harris, Charles H. III, and Saldler, Louis R. The Border and the Revolution. Las Cruces, New Mexico: Center for Latin American Studies/Joint Border Research Institute New Mexico State University, 1988.
- Hart, John Mason. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
- Hill, Larry D. Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973.
- Huidekoper, Frederic Louis. The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: The History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915.
- Hull, William H. Preparedness: The American Versus the Military Programme. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1916.
- Jacobs, James Ripley. The Beginning of the U.S. Army 1783-1812. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.
- Kerrick, Harrison S. Military and Naval America. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1916.
- Katz, Friedrich. The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution Volume One: Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

- Lane, Jack C. Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood. San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978.
- Lieuwin, Edwin. Mexican Militarism: The Rise and Fall of the Mexican Revolutionary Army 1910-1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968.
- Link, Arthur S. Wilson: Confusions and Crisis 1915-1916. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916.
- Link, Arthur S. Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.
- Mahon, John K. History of the Militia and the National Guard. New York: Macmillin Publishing Co., 1983.
- Martin, James Kirby, and Lender, Mark Edward, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789. Arlington Heights, Il: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982.
- Mason, Herbert Molloy Jr. The Great Pursuit. New York: Random House, Inc., 1970.
- Maxim, Hudson. Defenseless America. New York: Hearst's International Library Co., 1915.
- Maxwell, George H. Our National Defence The Patriotism of Peace. Washington: Rural Settlements Administration, 1915.
- Millett, Allen R., and Maslowski, Peter. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1984.
- Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931.
- Prucha, Francis Paul. The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
- Raat, W. Dirk. The Mexican Revolution: An Annotated Guide to Recent Scholarship. Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1982.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. Fear God and Take Your Own Part. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1916.
- Royster, Charles. A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

- Scott, Major General Hugh Lenox. Some Memories of a Soldier. New York: The Century Company, 1928.
- Shy, John. A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- Smythe, Donald. Pershing General of the Armies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956.
- Szatmary, David P. Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980.
- Tompkins, Frank. Chasing Villa: the Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico. Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1934.
- Trask, David F. The War with Spain in 1898. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981.
- Upton, Emory. The Military Policy of the United States. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907.
- Utley, Robert M. The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890. University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
- Vandiver, Frank E. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977.
- Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
- Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan Co., Inc., 1967.
- Weigley, Russell F. Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962.
- Williams, T. Harry. Americans at War The Development of the American Military System. Louisiana State University Press, 1960.
- Williams, T. Harry. The History of American Wars From 1745 to 1918. New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 1981.
- Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico Belgium and Chile. Garden City New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1927.

Wood, Leonard. Our Military History Its Facts and Fallacies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915.

Wood, Leonard. The Military Obligation of Citizenship. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915.

Woodhull, Maxwell Van Zandt. West Point in our Next War: The Only Way to Create and Maintain an Army. New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1915.

Wooster, Robert. Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993.

Articles

Hawkins, Clyde E. "What Horse for the Cavalry." Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 28 (July 1917), 100.

Helderman, Leonard C. "The Northwest Expedition of George Rogers Clark, 1786-178." Mississippi Valley Historical Review 25 (December 1938), 317-334.

Listman, John, "Old Dominion's Wartime Maneuvers Along the Rio Grande." The National Guard Magazine 46 (May 1992), 45.

Lyons, Gene M., and Masland, John W. "Origins of the R.O.T.C." Military Affairs; Journal of the American Military Institute 23 (Spring 1959), 1-12.

Mahon, John K. "Pennsylvania and the Beginnings of the Regular Army." Pennsylvania History 21 (January 1954), 33-44.

Parker, James "Cavalry and Auto Trucks." Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 27 (July 1916), 349-360.

Patton, George S. Jr., "A Defense of the Saber." Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 27 (July 1916), 48-50.

Rhodes, Charles D. "Notes on Cavalry Equipment." Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 28 (July 1917), 82-90.

Todd, Frederick P. "Our National Guard," Military Affairs 5 (Summer 1941), 73-86, 152-170.

Essay Collections

Ferling, John, ed. The World turned Upside Down: The American Victory in the War of Independence. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Gross, Robert A., ed. In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993.

Greene, Jack P., ed. The American Revolution; Its Character and Limits. New York: New York University Press, 1987.

Van Valkenburgh, Agnes, ed. Selected Articles on National Defense including Compulsory Military Service, Vol II. From the "Debaters Handbook Series, New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 191.